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Abstract 
 
The Middle East has witnessed in the past two decades an increase in the number of 
internal conflicts within many states. Many of those internal conflicts had developed into 
a religious strife between Sunnis and Shi’as. Today in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain 
there is an ongoing conflicts between representatives of both sects; whether it is a state or 
transnational actors. The Middle East has not witnessed a struggle between the two most 
popular sects of Islam since the Ottoman-Safavid war in 16th century. 
 
To analyze the cause behind the rise in conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites; there must 
be an examination of the states and religious actors that contributed to the rise of this 
conflict. Therefore, this paper attempts to study each of Saudi Arabia and Iran; as they 
had played a large role in supporting Islamist movements in the Middle East.  
 
The relationship between both Saudi Arabia and Iran before the Islamic Revolution had 
managed to stabilize the relationship between Sunnis and Shi’as. However, a change of 
the Iranian regime’s identity and its Shiite Islamization had sparked a tension between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Later, the conflict between both states had moved into other states 
such as Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. In order to analyze the impact of religious 
identity on the struggle between the two states; the paper examines each states’ identity 
formation, their linkage to other religious Islamist movement and how it contributed to an 
increase in internal conflicts in the Middle East. 
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Chapter II 
Introduction 
 
I. Origins of the Conflict 
Not since the Ottoman-Persian wars has the Middle East witnessed any major conflict 
between the Shiites and Sunnis; even though this main division within Islam for centuries 
has been a source of conflict in the Middle East; since the First Fitna War between Ali 
Bin Abu Talib and Muw’ayyia.  
Today there are two regional powers in the Middle-East each presenting itself as a 
stronghold for Islam; Iran as a Shiite stronghold and Saudi Arabia as a Sunni (particulary 
Salafi) stronghold. The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1923 to 1979 for 
most period of that time was exceptionally good; as both states had cooperated in many 
issues such as oil, maintaining stability in the Gulf Islands and the containment of 
Communism and Nasserism.1 However, all this changed in 1979 when the Islamists 
(Islamic Clerics) managed to rule Iran after a popular revolution that managed to oust 
Shah Mohamed Reza. The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini to power saw a quick deterioration 
of both countries’ bilateral relationship as the Saudis feared the growing Iranian influence 
in the region.  
i. The Iranian Revolution and the threat to the Security of the Gulf : 
The new Islamic Republic of Iran tried to export its own revolution to other Islamic 
States; encouraging Islamists and especially Shi’as to revolt against their leaders. This 
 
1 Badeeb, Saeed M. Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932-1982. London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies and 
Echoes, 1993.. 
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was clearly evident in Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology as he thought to spread ‘Islamic 
Revolutions’ across the Middle East; as he once said “Our movement is for an Islamic 
goal, not for Iran alone.. Iran has [only] been the starting point”.  2 
The Iranians had influenced the Shiites to revolt against the Saudi monarchy; which led 
to a seven day uprising in the city of Qatif in 1979. In addition, the Iranians were using 
hajj as a political theater in order to promote its leadership in the Islamic World and to 
discomfort the Saudi authorities. Later on in 1981, there was an attempted coup by the 
Iranian sponsored Islamic Front for Liberation (IFL) of Bahrain against the Bahraini 
monarchy.3 
ii. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War: 
Saudi Arabia, threatened by Iran’s rise in the region and threatening its own identity and 
regime’s stability, had allied itself with Saddam Hussein and supported his war against 
Iran.  In 1980, Saudi Arabia took the lead in mobilizing Arab financial support for Iraq 
and contributed into a US$20 billion financial aid by the end of 1982. 4The Saudi 
monarchy also moved into creating the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to contain the 
Iraqi power, Iranian hegemony and radical Islam. The funding of Wahhabi movements 
such as Al Qaeida in the 1980s had as well managed to repel other Shiite movements in 
 
2 Menashri, David. Post-revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power. London: Frank Cass, 
2001.. 
 
3 Louër, Laurence. Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: 
Columbia UP, 2008.33-45 
 
4  Furtig, Henner. Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 
2002. 
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both Pakistan and Afghanistan and thus limited the influence of Iranian clerics.5 Saudi 
Arabia had by the end of the First Gulf War weakened Iran and diminished its chance of 
exporting its own revolution. 
iii. The Fall of Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of the Shiite Crescent 
Saudi Arabia’s containment of Iran in the Gulf War only lasted for a decade and the 
political changes in the region managed to play to the advantage of Iran.  The United 
States in a retaliation for the September 9/11 attacks declared a war on terror and 
invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003; ousting two regimes (Al Taliban and 
Saddam Hussein) that were considered also Iran’s arch rivals. Hence, Iran’s influence in 
the region had again started to rise; it was able to fund Sunni Islamic movements such as 
Hamas in Palestine, Shiite Islamic movements as Hezbollah in Lebanon and its 
increasing influence in Iraq as its first government had a majority of Shiite. Saudi Arabia 
and its allies such as Jordan and Egypt felt threatened from the rising power of the Iranian 
regime. In late 2004, King Abdallah of Jordan explained his concern to the rise of "Shia 
crescent" that extended from Damascus to Tehran, passing through Baghdad, where a 
Shia-dominated government had taken power.6 
 
 
 
5 Mervin, Sabrina. The Shiʻa Worlds and Iran. London: Saqi, 2010.29-45 
 
6 Black, Ian. "Fear of a Shia Full Moon." The Guardian. January 26, 2007. Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack. 
. 
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iv. The Arab Spring and the rise of Conflict: 
The Arab Spring has worsened the struggle between the two regional powers in the 
Middle East. This had led some scholars often to describe their struggle as the new 
Middle Eastern Cold War. An example of this struggle could be further examined in 
Bahrain, Syria and Iraq. 
Bahrain had witnessed its own uprising in February 2011 when thousands of peaceful 
protestors marched to Pearl Square in Manama demanding political reform and the 
removal of King Hamad Bin Khalifa. The House of Khalifa has ruled the Kingdom of 
Bahrain since the late 18th century. Bahrain has witnessed a power struggle between the 
Shi’ite majority and the ruling Sunni minority ever since its independence in 1971. As 
previously mentioned before, Iran had attempted to overthrow the Bahraini monarchy in 
1981; however the coup failed. Bahrain is currently a member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and a major Saudi ally. 
Syria, similar to Bahrain, has witnessed its own uprisings in mid-March 2011 when many 
protests erupted throughout the country demanding the removal of Bashar Al Assad. The 
Arab Republic of Syria has been under control of the Assad family since 1970 and had 
witnessed an Islamists rebellion in the late 1970’s and the early 1980’s that was crushed 
later by Hafez El Assad. Similar to Bahrain, the minority Alawites rules the majority 
Sunni.  
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003; Iran had managed to help the Shiites in ruling 
Iraq. Iraq has however been unstable since the removal of Saddam Hussein and had 
witnessed a civil war between different ethno-sectarian communities and has been 
10 
 
witnessing a lot of tensions post the Arab Spring between the Sunnis and Shias and there 
is a possibility with the increasing influence of Islamic State in Syria and Levant (ISIL) 
that the Iraq may go through another civil war; as the Sunnis are extremely unhappy with 
the Shiite control over the country. 
II. Research Question: 
Since the 1950s, there has been a struggle for supremacy among the Arabs in the Middle 
East. In the 1950s and 1960s; the struggle was between Egypt and Saudi- Arabia. Egypt 
couldn’t win this struggle against the Saudi monarchy and therefore between the 1970s 
till the 1990s various states had tried to fill the void that Egypt had left (especially after 
its complete isolation from the Arab world); Syria, Iraq, Iran and recently Qatar and 
Turkey are among those that had challenged Saudi Arabia for supremacy. 
Yet, with the wave of change hitting the Middle East because of the Arab Spring; it is 
clearly evident now that the ongoing battle for supremacy is now between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Both states have been battling to gain more influence in the region; hence 
engaging in a religious war. Both Iran and Saudi are struggling to become the center of 
the Islamic World; as J.D Anthony explains “The Riyadh regime has been and remains 
profoundly disturbed by the Sunni-Shiite character of the war…on the sectarian level, 
Saudi Arabia is especially concerned about the potential of the Tehran government to 
undermine the Kingdom’s regional role”7 While Iranian Minister of Defense Ahmed 
Vahidi has further linked Iran’s soft power with Islam “Our soft war power is much more 
 
7 Furtig, Henner. Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 
2002. 
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than enemy’s since Islam and our beliefs are our backbone, and this backbone is the 
strongest in the world”8 As a result; most of the states that had been affected by the Arab 
Spring had experienced a period of instability and unrest; with bloodshed being common 
in most states. In the same period, we have been witnessing a power struggle between 
regional and global powers; as they have been all struggling to further increase their 
interests in the region. 
The main question of the proposed thesis is: What is the main drive that created the 
struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia? The sub questions are:  
• How did both Iran and Saudi Arabia use religion to maintain religious 
legitimacy domestically and internationally? 
• How did the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran affect Arab countries 
during the Arab Spring? 
III. Hypothesis: 
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran pre-1979 revolution as explained earlier 
was mentioned before exceptionally well; however the deterioration of the relationship 
between the two states occurred when Iran became an ‘Islamic State’. Before the Islamic 
Revolution,  the Saudi monarchy and the Shah of Iran got along earlier well even though 
the two states belonged to two different sects of Islam.  
Since the end of the second Gulf War, Iran had been heavily relying on ideology and 
religion in order to protect the regime’s legitimacy and to achieve its revolutionary goal 
 
8 "Defense Minister Reiterates Iran's High Soft Power." Fars News Agency. N.p., 4 December. 2012. 10  
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of becoming the sole Islamic power in the regime. This would also explain its interest in 
acquiring nuclear technology, its anti-Western rhetoric and its support for Islamist 
movements that are hostile to Israel. However, even though the Iranian regime claims to 
be supporting all Islamist movements, whether Sunni or Shiite; its support for the secular 
regime instead of the Sunni Islamists movements in Syria defies such a claim. 
Consequently, Iran’s support for Assad’s regime is because of the Assad’s religious 
identity which is ‘Alawism’; an offshoot sect of Shi’ism.  
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is probably the first state to adopt a pan-Islamist agenda 
since the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate. The Saudi monarchy had been using the 
Wahhabi Ideology since the 1960s in order to prevent revolutionary ideologies such as 
Communism, Pan-Arabism and Khomeini’s revolutionary ideas from spreading 
throughout the Middle East and for protecting its own legitimacy and status as the sole 
representative of the Islamic World. Saudi Arabia had been the major supporter in the 
past few decades of radical Sunni Islamic movements such as Al Taliban, Al Qaida, Liwa 
Al Islam in Syria in order to counter any foreign influence notably that of Iran, and at the 
same time maintain its own interests in the region. 
As both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been using religion to increase their influence in the 
Middle East, the current wave of instability resulting from the Arab Spring intensified the 
rivalry between the two countries. Since 2011, both states have been involved in the 
uprisings in Bahrain, Syria and Iraq where they posed against each other using religion as 
a primary tool of conflict. The Sunni population in both Iraq and Syria are currently 
unsatisfied with the Shiite and Alawite rule in Iraq and Syria and the Shiite majority in 
Bahrain have tried to rebel against the Sunni monarchy. The two powers are keen not 
13 
 
only to protect their interests in the region but also to harm one another, and therefore, 
entering into a second cold war in the Middle East. The first Cold War was between 
Saudi Arabia and Nasser’s Egypt. 
Therefore, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been since the outbreak of the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 competing for being the role of leadership among Muslim. Saudi 
Arabia already defines itself as the “Heartland of Islam” and sees itself “a leader in the 
pursuit of worldwide Islamic solidarity” 9 The state of Saudi Arabia seeks to be 
“committed to preserving the Islamic tradition in all areas of government and society”10. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s image has been undermined by Iran. In 1987 Ali 
Khamenei claimed that the there is no war between Sunnis and Shi’as; rather “This is a 
lie! Of course there is a war; but a war between the American perception of Islam and 
true revolutionary Islam”11 
IV. Conceptual Framework: 
The proposed thesis will be analyzed by using a mixed conceptual framework by relying 
mainly on constructivism theory and the role of religion in international relations. 
i. Constructivism: The social Construction of Power Politics: 
Constructivist theory offers a new alternative to international relations that has been 
dominated by realists and liberalists in the past few decades. Constructivism concentrates 
 
9 "Saudi Arabia: Islam's Heartland." Saudi Arabia: Islam's Heartland. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia 
Washington, n.d. Web. 13 Nov. 2013. 
10 "Saudi Arabia: Islam's Heartland." Saudi Arabia: Islam's Heartland. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia 
Washington, n.d. Web. 13 Nov. 2013. 
11 Kramer, Martin S. Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East. New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1996.. 
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on issues of identity in world politics and the theorization of domestic politics and culture 
in international relations theory.12 
Alexander Wendt argues that anarchy is what states make of it; meaning that the realist 
argument of self-help is due to process; not the structure and therefore self-help and 
power politics are institutions and not essential features of anarchy. The distribution of 
power, according to Wendt, may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so 
depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the “distribution of 
knowledge” that constitute their conceptions of self and other. 13 In other words, as Ted 
Hopf explains the action of actors “Meaningful behavior, or action is possible only within 
an intersubjective social context. Actors develop their relations with, and understandings 
of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of 
power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning.”14 
According to K.M. Fierke, constructivists have highlighted several themes as they argue 
that international relations is a social construction. First is that the idea of social 
construction suggests difference across context rather than single objective reality. 
Therefore, constructivists seek to understand changes in relationship between states at the 
international level. Second, constructivists have shed light on the social dimensions of 
international relations; thus demonstrating the importance of norms, rules and language at 
this level. Lastly, constructivists have defined international politics is a ‘world of our 
 
12 Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations." International Security.Pp. 171-
200 23.1 (1998): 171-200.. 
13 Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics." International Organization 46.02 (1992): 391.  
 
14 Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations." International Security. 23.1 
(1998): 171-200.. 
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making’; as they have introduced the possibility of agency and have emphasized process 
of interaction, as the actor makes choices are made through the process of interacting 
with each other and thus enters history, culture and political distinct reality into being. 
15Furthermore, Wendt argues about the importance of identity and interests in changing 
the states policies and the structure of the system. According to Wendt, actors acquire 
identities, by participating in such collective meanings. For the actors, each identity is 
inherently social definition of the actor; which affects the perspective of actors about 
themselves and therefore constitutes the structure of the social world. Therefore, 
identities are the basis of interests; they define their interest in the process of defining 
situations. Wendt adds that institutions can have an effect into bringing new identities and 
interests and gave an example of the European states new identity after the cold war.  
Wendt identities three security systems that seek to explain the relationship between 
states; the competitive security system, the individualistic security system and the 
cooperative security system.  
• Competitive Security System: States identify negatively with each other’s security 
and therefore an actor’s gain is seen as another’s loss. 
• Individualistic Security System: in which states are indifferent to the relationship 
between their own and others security.  
• Cooperative security system: in which states identify positively with one another 
so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all actors. 
 
15 Dunne, Timothy, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013.. 
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Lastly, Wendt argues that actors respond towards an object on the basis of the meanings 
that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward 
friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.  
Identity politics is very important in the Middle East. The first Middle Eastern Cold War 
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s can be viewed as a 
struggle between Islamism and Arab Nationalism. The Iranian revolution had an impact 
on changing the relationship of Iran with the entire Islamic world; as the change from a 
secular to a revolutionary Islamist regime had been welcome as well as it threatened 
many states and movements. The Iranian Islamist regime at the time had a vision of 
spreading Islamic revolutions all over the Middle East and had directly challenged the 
Saudi monarchy that views itself as a Pan-Islamist leader.  
However, there are some limitations to the constructivist approach. Stefano Guzzini 
argues that constructivism is considered eclectic and redundant. It is eclectic in the sense 
that many constructivists use their own version of constructivism without taking into 
consideration the final theoretical outcome.  While it is also redundant because it adds 
some amendments to already existing approaches.16 Furthermore, the constructivist 
approach doesn’t concentrate much on power as realists and therefore takes into little 
consideration the economic and military factors. Ronan Plan argues that the constructivist 
argument places ‘ideas’ as the most important change factor in order and international 
 
16 Guzzini, Stefano. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism." European Journal of International Relations 6, 
no. 2 (2000): 148-50. Accessed December 14, 2014. 
http://ejt.sagepub.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/6/2/147.full.pdf html. 
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system can be empirically and methodologically proven wrong; as the material interests 
override ideology.17 
Yet, it would be very difficult to explain the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran using 
other international relation theories such as realism and liberalism. As Paul Kowert 
argues, both theories are unable to explain for the reasons for the widespread of violence 
in the region that doesn’t serve either national interest or Mammon. Furthermore, both 
theories are problem-solving theories that place a special focus on basic human need, 
material interests and security. 18Whereas constructivism places special emphasis on 
identity, as Kowert states, “ Identity is the medium through which national leaders and 
ordinary citizens alike translate recognition of similarity and difference (in threat, 
capabilities, and so on) into ontological statements about international relation”19 
However, taking into consideration the limitations of the constructivist approach, the 
thesis will use a similar approach that Ted Hopf used in his book ‘Social Construction of 
International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies’. The author uses constructivism in 
his analysis to explain Soviet and Russian foreign policies.  The author uses domestic 
factors in order to producing "a thin cognitive account of identity that is thickly inductive 
and empirical" Accordingly, his book provides "an account of how a state's domestic 
identities constitute a social cognitive structure that makes threats and opportunities, 
 
17 Palan, Ronen. "A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International 
Relations." Review of International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 575-98. 
18 Kowert, Paul. The Peril and Promise of Constructivism Theory. Ritsumeikan University. March 1, 2001. 
158 
19 Ibid ,165 
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enemies and allies, intelligible, thinkable, and possible"20 This would be the most suitable 
way, as will be proven later, to analyze the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
and how it affects the Middle East in terms of ideological influence. 
ii. Religion in International Relations: 
This particular part will cover the importance of religion in international relations and 
explain the importance of religion for policy makers to gain legitimacy internally and 
externally. However, in order to understand why both states are acting in hostility 
towards each other; the thesis will use the suggested approach of Rebbica Glazier in 
which it is going to tackle “the nature of religious beliefs, the content of religious beliefs, 
and how these beliefs are connected to real events in a way that motivates believers to 
take political action.”21 This method will be used to explain the Wahhabism and Shiism 
and their relevance towards state policies. 
Religion has been in general largely ignored by social scientist and in particular 
international relation theorists. Fox and Sandler argue that secularism and modernity 
theories are the main reason behind the foundation of international relations on the basis 
of rejecting religion as a mean for understanding society. This is a mistake that western 
policy makers and scholars usually make when studying and analyzing the Middle East 
and hence they are often surprised by political events that are ignited by religious 
motives; as Robert Wuthnow further explains “If the Middle East continues to produce 
 
20 Hopf, Ted. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 
and 1999. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002. Print..3 
21 Durward, Rosemary, and Lee Marsden. Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention. Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2009.. 
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surprises, these surprises are not simply failings in the capacity of our theories to predict 
the location and timing of the next political crisis. They are instead surprises that betray a 
deeper bewilderment and confusion. We do not understand when a Muslim leader (i.e. 
Ayatollah Khomeini) calls the United States the “infidel”…We do not understand 
because our theories provide no basis from which to understand”22 
It is also important as well to understand the relationship between civil wars and religion. 
Religion matters as it can influence the identities and loyalties of the players in the 
conflict and can influence the political goals of the combatant parties as well. According 
to empirical evidence, from 1940-2010, 44 religious wars occurred out of 135 civil wars; 
27 of the civil wars had religion as a central element.23 
iii. Topic Relation in Regards to the Two Mentioned Theories: 
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran had taken a dramatic change after the 
Iranian revolution and thus the thesis will use the constructivist approach in which it 
argues that the change in the identity of the Iranian regime led by a peoples’ revolution 
had led to a sore relationship with Saudi Arabia. In addition, the thesis paper will cover 
the importance of religious scholars/ulama in the policy making of both respective states 
domestically and internationally and how it affects the perception of the other. 
The Saudi monarchy and the Iranian Ayatollahs both depend on the use of Islam for 
legitimacy domestically and internationally. The two states depend on religious 
 
22 Thomas, Scott. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: 
The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. 
23 Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel. Shah. God's Century: Resurgent Religion and 
Global Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011. Print. 
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movements in order to promote their supremacy.  Therefore, the two states’ interests 
usually collide with each other because of their ideological differences. 
Little academic research has looked into religion as a source of legitimacy or conflict in 
International relations.  As a result, not much study has been done to understand the 
source of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its effect on the Middle East.  In 
order to understand the struggle between both nations; there must be a study of the 
history of Sunni and Shiite Islam, the importance of religious legitimacy to both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran and the relationship between religion and war.24  
V. Literature Review 
 The literature review will discuss the importance of the use of Islam in foreign 
policies and the importance of identity politics in the Middle East and focus on both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. It will also cover the state formation of both Saudi Arabia and Iran 
in order to show that both states are mainly dependent on religion for legitimacy and thus 
religious scholars usually influence decision makers. It will also cover the Shiite-
Wahhabi ideology and point out the religious perspectives between the two schools of 
Islam. The thesis will discuss the relationship of Islam with the foreign policies of Saudi 
Arabia and Iran; how both states used Islam to pursue their interests. Lastly, a section 
will be dedicated to discuss the role of both states in the Arab Spring; how did the 
struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia shape conflicts in both Syria and Iraq.  
i. Identity, Islam and Pan-Islamism in IR: 
 
24 Thomas, Scott. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: 
The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. 
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In order to prove the importance of identity, Islam and Pan-Islam in International 
Relations; the thesis uses multiple sources that discuss the importance of identity in 
international relations and the Middle East. For instance, Margaret Law in ‘Nationalism 
and Middle Eastern Identities’ to show the importance of identities in the Middle East 
have evolved in their historical context. Law looks at identity formation in the region and 
its leading to a social structure in the area. Law also helps prove how identity defines 
politics in the Middle East and how change of identity transforms the relationship 
between states.25 While J. Harris Proctor in his book ‘Islam and International Relations’ 
gives a historical incite about the relationship between Islam and International relations. 
Proctor explains the early Islamic Caliphate perception of foreign states outside the 
Caliphate and how it evolved during the Ottoman Caliphate. Furthermore, the book 
shows the importance of religion in politics in both Christianity and Islam; however it 
moves to discuss Islamic theory of international relations and its contemporary relevance. 
It later uses Nasser’s Egypt as a model to show the importance of Islam in strengthening 
the Arab Nationalist ideology and its effect on Egyptian Foreign policy.26 Lastly, Jacob 
Landau in his book ‘Identities in International Relations’ discusses the origin of pan-
Islamism in the Ottoman Empire and the different definitions of Pan-Islamism and how 
effective it was in achieving in the goals of the Ottoman caliphate in the Arab World and 
specifically focusing on the first World War. In addition, it shows how Pan-Islam had a 
 
25 Krause, Jill, and Neil Renwick. Identities in International Relations. New York: St. Martin's, 1996. Print. 
26 Proctor, J.Harris. Islam and International Relations. New York: Praeger, 1965. 
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strong effect on the Islamic world and its people since the Ottoman Era and how it 
managed to achieve the interests of states such as Saudi Arabia.27 
ii. Religion and the State: 
In this chapter, the thesis attempts to analyze the role of religion and religious institution 
in the formation of the state. The chapter gives an incite of the development of  political 
Islam in the Middle East and the Islamic World. Peter Mandville in his book Global 
Political Islam shows the importance of Islam in the Islamic World and its ability to 
provide political legitimacy as well as create conflicts in the region. The book shows the 
history of political Islamist movements, their development and  their influence on the 
Muslim population taking into consideration the obstacles that political Islamists 
movements face. It particularly addresses the role of Wahhabi ulama in the Saudi state 
and the new challenges that Wahhabism faces domestically and internationally.28Frank 
Vogel discusses the formation of the Saudi state via Wahhabis and its role in foreign 
policy and its relation to terrorism. This covers a huge part in the identity formation of 
the Saudi state and gives a history of how Wahhabism contributed into the formation of 
the Saudi identity and the challenges that face the Wahhabi ulama in Saudi Arabia.29 
iii. Religion and Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy 
 
27 Landau, Jacob M. The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. Oxford, England: Clarendon, 
1990. Print. 
 
28 Mandaville, Peter G. Global Political Islam. London: Routledge, 2007 
29 Hefner, Robert W. Shariʻa Politics Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2011.. 
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The Al Saud monarchy has been dependent on Wahhabi ideology to shape its domestic 
policy through education, religious and legal institutions but there was little use of 
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy during the early years of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. However, the situation changed as communism and pan-Arabism was 
spreading throughout the Middle East in the late 1950’s; especially rise of the charisma 
of Abdel Nasser and the growing role of Egypt in the Arab World had posed a threat on 
the Al Saud monarchy. In 1962, King Faisal had authored the ‘Islamic Policy’ in 
response to Nasser’s socialism ideology and to the invasion of Yemen and thus created 
the World Muslim League. 30The World Muslim League was a religious organization 
that would fund education, publication and Islamic culture centers. The WML contained 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement that were persecuted in their homeland 
and they were heavily influential in the movement. King Faisal had also set up another 
inter-governmental organization in 1969; the Organization for Islamic Conference. The 
Organization for Islamic Conference had the power to set up financial institutions and 
charities; this helped in creating movements for promoting popular assistance to 
Muslims. The promotion of pan-Islamism by King Faisal had managed not only to 
contain Arab Nationalism but it had also made Saudi Arabia a significant player 
regionally and internationally. Thomas Hegghammer in his book Jihad in Saudi Arabia: 
Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 illustrates the changes in Saudi foreign policy 
under King Fahd and its use of pan-Islamism in funding Islamic militants such as 
 
30 Commins, David Dean. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009. 
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Taliban in Afghanistan and how it had an impact on the rise of terrorism and how the 
use of ideology made Saudi Arabia capable of exporting its ideology.31 
iv. Religion and Iranian Foreign Policy 
The revolutionary change in Iran had led to a couple of major changes in Iran’s foreign 
policy; including the creation of transnational Shia networks in Shiite areas in the 
Middle East and Islamic World. Sabrina Mervin in The Shi’a World and Iran shows the 
impact of the Iranian revolution on the relationship between Iran and Shiite Muslims. It 
discusses the similarity of identity between Iran and the Shi’a population in Asia and 
Africa and discusses Iran’s foreign policy in relation to the majority and minority of 
those Shi’ites. In addition, it also shows the obstacles that Iran face in its exportation of 
its own ideology.32 Whereas Laurence Louer in Transnational Shia Politics illustrates 
the formation of Shi’a networks in three Gulf States; Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
in which it gives a brief history of their activities in the three states and the new political 
changes and its effect on their increased influence. It also shows the link between the 
Shiite networks and Iran and their political goal of achieving political autonomy; as 
Laurence Louer argues in this book.33 
v. Struggle For Supremacy: Saudi Arabia vs Iran: 
 
31 Hegghammer, Thomas. Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge UP, 2010. 
 
32 Mervin, Sabrina. The Shiʻa Worlds and Iran. London: Saqi ;, 2010. 
 
33 Louër, Laurence. Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: 
Columbia UP, 2008. 
 
25 
 
The Saudi regime has been threatened by Iran ever since its revolution in 1989; as Iran 
undermines the legitimacy and security of the Saudi regime.  The rhetoric of the Saudi 
officials according to Ed Hussien, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, seemed 
hostile towards Iran and they were desperate for a “Again and again, and in passionate 
terms, Saudi political leaders were keen to stress the importance of arming Syrian 
opposition players, bombing Iran’s alleged nuclear facilities, and unflinchingly 
supporting the al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain.” 34 
The Saudi monarchy has been for the past two decades trying to diminish the Iranian 
influence in the Middle East by using identity and especially religion, as Hillary 
Leverett, former white house official says “They [Saudi Arabia] also want to portray [it 
as] the Iranians don’t stand for Muslim causes, beliefs, independence or 
nationalism…The Saudis want others in the region to see the Iranians as Shiite, Persian, 
non-Arab, non-Sunni…While the Saudi message is that the Shiites are infiltrating Arab 
affairs to undermine the Sunni community and the Sunni state.”35 
Nibras Kazimi provides an early prediction in which he saw that Syria might be the place 
where jihadist would rise against the Syrian regime. In his book, Syria through Jihadist 
eyes: the perfect enemy: Kazimi discusses the ideological differences between the 
Wahhabi movements in Iraq and other jihad movements in the Arab world with the 
Alawites; which are viewed as ‘heretics’ by those movements. The book also covers the 
 
34 Husain, Ed. "Iran Versus Saudi Arabia: Cold War in the Middle East." Council on Foreign Relations, 20 
Apr. 2012. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. 
 
35 Dow, Nicole. "Iran's Soft Power Messaging?" Global Public Square. CNN, 31 Aug. 2012. Web. 24 Oct. 
2013. 
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views of Shiites on the Alawites and Syria. The book will be useful, as it would cover the 
reasons behind the engagement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Syrian Civil War.36 
vi. Other Literature: 
Simon Mabon in his book ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran- Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle 
East’ uses a constructivist-realist approach (Realism of Hinnebusch and the 
Constructivism of Michael Barnett) to analyze the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Mabon mainly examines the impact of identity incongruence upon regional security. 
Mabon studies the impact of history, culture, religion, ethnicity and security dilemma and 
on the rivalry. While Mabon’s argument in the book is more diverse than this thesis as it 
covers the root causes for the rivalry between both states; yet it doesn’t give much 
attention to the impact of religion. Yet, similarly to this thesis, Mabon covers identity, 
state formation and its impact on each state’s foreign policy and rivalry. 37 
 
VI. Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis seeks to use religious studies infused with politics to explain 
the struggle between two states.  The study of the use of both states religion to promote 
their interests is indeed a unique case that can be only witnessed in the Middle East and a 
study that has been undermined by many political science scholars.  Thus, it aims to 
analyze the role of religious institutions play in in domestic and international politics and 
how they are used by both the Saudi monarchy and the Iranian clerics.   
 
36 Kazimi, Nibras. Syria through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2010. 
 
37 Mabon, Simon. Saudi Arabia and Iran Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. 
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VII. Methods 
The proposed thesis will depend on primary sources in order to collect the needed data.  
The data will consist of the following: books, journal articles, newspapers and journals, 
research reports, religious scholarly writing, newspaper opinion-editorials.  By focusing 
on, Iraq and Syria, the thesis intends to use the case study approach, to prove that the 
religious identity struggle is the main drive of conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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Chapter II 
Identity, Islam and Pan Islamism in International Relations 
 
I. Introduction: 
In the Middle East, there has been a common use of identity as a tool by most of the 
regimes in the region in order to strengthen its legitimacy domestically and 
internationally. Hence, the Middle East has witnessed numerous conflicts that can be 
attributed to ideological difference, whether domestic or regional conflicts. For example, 
the Lebanese Civil War that erupted in 1975 had witnessed many sectarian conflicts 
between Sunnis, Shi’as and Maronites. In addition, the first Arab Cold  War that took 
place in the late 1950’s had been more of an ideological war between Nasser’s version of 
Arab Nationalism and King Saud and Faisal’s Pan Islamism; as both regimes struggled 
for power and influence in the Middle East. Lastly, the ongoing conflict between Israel 
and Palestine shows that identity still plays an important role in escalating the conflict 
between the Israelis and Arabs. Therefore, it is difficult to reach a peace agreement 
between the Israelis and Palestinians; as the Israelis are demanding the recognition as a 
‘Jewish State’ while the Arabs and Palestinians are refusing to do so. 
Hence, in order to understand why the region is experiencing so many conflicts, 
especially the current Iranian-Saudi Arabia struggle, there must be a deep understanding 
of identity and its influence in domestic politics and international relations. 
Consequently, this chapter will focus on analyzing the importance of identity in 
international relations as well as explaining the relevant ideologies of Islam and the 
origins of Pan-Islam in order to provide the necessary basis that would later explain the 
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religious identity of the Saudi and Iranian regime while illustrating the historical conflict 
between the Sunni and Shi’ite Islam and the use of the Iranian and Saudi religion in order 
to advance their interests in the Middle East. 
II. Identity and International Relations 
The explanation of identity and social identity is quite complex and ambiguous especially 
in international relations; therefore it is important to begin with a simple psychological 
explanation of the term “identity”.  Using Stephan Desrochers, assistant professor of 
psychology in Georgia Gwinnet College, explanation; identity is defined as one's answers 
to the question 'Who am I?’ . The answer to this question is linked to the roles people 
occupy in society, and therefore they are often referred to as "role identities" or simply 
"identities" . Thus, these role identities are said to influence behavior in that each role has 
a set of associated meanings and expectations for the self. 38 While Kelly Hannum, 
Director, Global Research Insights at the Center for Creative Leadership, gives a 
definition of social identity as  “the combination of aspects of our selves-including age, 
ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, and socio-economic 
status- that make us a part of various social groups.”39 
Jan Aart Scholte argues that the construction of an identity is a crucial aspect of social 
life. Identity has an effect on all human interests, activities, norm and social structure; to 
the extent that history is filled with incidents where people have killed and been killed in 
 
38 Desrochers, S., Andreassi, J., & Thompson, C. (2004). Identity Theory. Organization Management 
Journal, 1(1), 61-69. 
  
39 Hannum, Kelly. Social Identity Knowing Yourself, Leading Others. Greensboro, N.C.: Center for 
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the assertion of the sense of self.40 While Chris Farrands argues that identity affects 
society both as individuals and as members of groups and thus it has an effect on decision 
makers as he explains “we are in touch with the sources of our identity even if we have 
no real influence over them or are unconscious of their impact.”41 
Early international relations scholars such as some traditional realists have undermined 
the importance of identity in international relations because of their single-minded pursuit 
of a mechanical model of international relations based on a system of states. In addition, 
identity in international relations was associated with the study of nationalism. However, 
this has recently came under heavy criticism, as Benedict Anderson argues in his 
influential text ‘Imagined Communities’ that national identity is a wholly artificial or 
social construction; as he further defines the concept of the nation as “I propose the 
following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community-and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”42  
Therefore, nationalism can’t be solely considered the only identity existing in 
international relations; as religion and other supra-national ideologies precedes 
nationalism and had been an effective factor in determining the relationship between 
 
40 Krause, Jill. Identities in International Relations. Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996. 38-79 
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states. A good example is the change of the identity of the Iranian state from secular to 
Islamic state led to the deterioration of the relationship between the United States and 
Iran as Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the United States as the “Great Satan” 43 
III. Religion and Identity 
The development of identity throughout history illustrates that identity can’t be solely 
tied to nationalism. According to Daniel Chirot, early humans’ only group loyalties were 
to their families. People identified with their group and it was within each one that critical 
decisions were made about resource allocation, how to provide for food, and what 
strategies to use to maintain security. Later, larger family groups, eventually clans, 
became the main focus of such political identities within which decisions were made to 
affect survival. At some points the clans formed tribes, which were larger groups that still 
considered themselves related in some ways.  Part of the common set of beliefs or culture 
that these tribes or ethnic group shared was religious, common gods, rules of behavior, 
and myths about creation and their place in the universe. 44 
The concept of religion being used as an ideology has been historically found in ancient 
empires such as those of Egypt, India, Rome and China. Religions were  used by states to 
gain some sort of legitimacy; hence it was a tool to get their subjects to accept that it is 
right for those with power to possess it. In the Ancient history, rulers were sometimes 
associated with the god and that they were considered either divine or given mystical 
 
43 Black, Ian. "'Great Satan' Warned of a Burning Hell." 'Great Satan' Warned of a Burning Hell, February 
16, 2005. Accessed November 24, 2014. 
 
44 Chirot, Daniel. Contentious Identities: Ethnic, Religious, and Nationalist Conflicts in Today's World. 
New York: Routledge, 2011.1-11 
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powers. Yet, even with the emergence of monotheistic religions such as Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam; the perception of the population toward their rulers’ didn’t remain 
similar to the ancient perception. Religion became an important part of how people saw 
themselves; it was another important way in which various groups saw themselves and 
distinguished themselves from non-believers. The Middle Ages and Renaissance era 
witnessed many wars in the name of religion; such as the nine crusades and the Thirty 
Years War.  45 
Religion was also used as a political tool to gain legitimacy from the people and it was an 
identity that could integrate people with different language, ethnicity and cultures and 
beliefs; whether through the Caliphate or the Papacy. The Caliphate, for instance, was a 
religious symbol that was established by the first Caliph Abu Bakr El Sidik and its main 
principle was creating a unified Islamic Umma and thus maintaining the unity of the 
Muslims through a single leader that was considered the successor of the Prophet 
(PBUH). The religious symbolism of the Caliphate therefore was important for 
maintaining order in the Muslim World. According to Marjorie Kelly ,even though the 
Abbasid’s had lost control over their empire during their reign; yet they were still 
maintained as a symbol of legitimate government and unity among Muslims.46  
The following section therefore will provide a brief introduction to Islam and pan-Islam 
which would attempt to illustrate the importance of religion in the Muslim World and the 
appeal of Islam towards the Muslim population and how it was used through foreign 
policy to serve the interest of the state. 
 
45 Ibid 
46 Kelly, Marjorie. Islam the Religious and Political Life of a World Community. New York: Praeger, 1984. 
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IV. Islam and Pan-Islamism 
i. Introduction to the rise of political Islam: 
It is estimated that 23.2% of the world’s population are followers of Islam; making it the 
second largest religious group in the world. The religion of Islam originated in the city of 
Mecca (in the Arabian Peninsula) by the seventh century. Before Islam, the Arabian 
Peninsula, according to Dr. Mohd Shukri Hanapi, witnessed a dark period that was 
named Jahiliyyah  (Ignorance). Hanapi gives a brief description of the Jahiliyyah period, 
in accordance to other historical records, in which the people at that time worshipped 
idols and believed in animism, lived chaotically and their manners were almost non-
existent, for example they were cruel, arrogant and stubborn.47 Prophet Muhammed 
(PBUH) was born in 570 AD in Mecca and started his religious role at the age in 610 AD 
at the age of forty when archangel Gabriel appeared to the prophet and informed him that 
he was the messenger of Allah. Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) had then started to preach 
to the people of Mecca and asked them to stop worshipping idols and submit into Islam; 
hence referring to the submission to Allah. The religion of Islam offers more than the 
metaphysics of the divine oneness; it also introduces a complete moral system. In 
addition, there are five main pillars of Islam that are composed of:  
• Shahada: recognizing the singular nature of Allah and that Prophet Muhammed as 
his messenger. 
• Salat (Prayers): Performing prayers five times a day. 
 
47 Hanapi1, Mohd. "From Jahiliyyah To Islamic Worldview: In A Search Of An Islamic Educational 
Philosophy." International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3, no. 2 (2014): 213-20. Accessed 
November 24, 2014. 
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• Fasting from dawn to dusk during Ramadan.  
• Payment of zakat (alms) to the poor and needy. 
• Pilgrim to the Kaaba.48 
However, the message of Islam was heavily resisted by the people of Mecca, especially 
from their nobles that were responsible for the persecution and hostility of the early 
followers of Islam in Mecca. As a result, Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) had then decided 
to move to the city of Yathrib, now named as Medina, after the Prophet (PBUH) had 
found acceptance to his message from the people of Yathrib and had invited all the 
Muslims in Mecca to join them in Yathrib. This journey of the Muslims and the Prophet 
(PBUH) was known as the Hijra (migration) was later marked as the start of the Islamic 
year. 49 
The Prophet (PBUH) had been engaged in a series of tribal wars with the people of 
Mecca and their allies. During his time in Yathrib, the prophet had focused on preaching 
the message of Islam in other areas of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Abyssinia and 
Persia. The Prophet (PBUH) had eventually managed in 8th year of Hijra to take over 
Mecca and before his death; the entire Arab Peninsula had converted to Islam.50 
ii. The Origins of the Sunni-Shiite Divide 
The death of Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) had marked the beginning of Muslim 
politics, which had led to the rise of debate and contestation between multiple 
 
48 Mandaville, Peter G. Global Political Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.24-48  
49Ibid 
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interpretations of the religion. The first debate rose between the Muslims as they were 
attempting to choose a successor to rule the Muslim community. One camp (later 
identifying themselves as Shi’a) believed that the successor should be chosen from the 
House of the Prophet and had hence  favored Ali Bin Abi Talib, the cousin of the 
prophet. The second camp (later identifying themselves as Sunna) preferred choosing a 
leader according to the consensus of the community’s senior figures. In the end, Abu 
Bakr was chosen to became the first caliph and hence the establishment of the political 
institution of the caliphate.51 
Eventually, after the assassination of the third Caliph Uthman Bin Affan,  Ali Bin Abu 
Talib was chosen to become the fourth Caliph of the Islamic Empire. However, Ali’s 
caliphate was not accepted by both Aisha B. Abu Bakr, the prophet’s widow and the 
daughter of Abu Bakr,  as she accused Ali of being negligent in bringing Uthman's 
killers to justice and resulted into the first battles of the first fitna war between Ali and 
Aisha (known as the Battle of the Camel). After Ali managed to defeat Aisha in the 
Battle of the Camel, Muwawy’ia bin Abi Sufyan, an Ummayad and a relative of Uthman 
ibn Affan, challenged Ali for the caliphate as he was discontent for Ali not bringing the 
killers of Uthman to justice. This led to the rise of another battle between Muwawy’ia 
bin Abi Sufyan and Ali bin Abi Talib, known as the Battle of Saffin, which end in both 
sides agreeing to settle the dispute through arbitration.52  
 
51 Ibid 
 
52 "Sunni and Shi'a." BBC News. August 19, 2009. Accessed November 24, 2014. 
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The resulting negotiations between both the representative of Ali and Muway’iah had 
weakened the stance of Ali as a caliph; as Ali’s representative was beaten by 
Muway’iah’s representative.  In addition, Ali’s acceptance of arbitration had created for 
him new enemies, the Kharijities, whom were later on responsible for his assassination 
in Kufa. 53After the death of Ali, Muwayi’ah became the fifth caliph of the Islamic 
World as the son of Ali, Hassan voluntarily gave up the caliphate for the unity of the 
Islamic Umma.54 
However, the division between the Sunni-Shiite deepened after the death of Muway’iah 
and the succession of his son Yazid as the second Caliph of the Ummayad Dynasty. The 
younger son of Ali, Al Husyan, refused to give his allegiance to Yazid ; as like many 
other Muslims, he considered that Yazid’s appointment was illegitimate because none of 
the previous caliphs were appointed by dynastic succession and all were at least 
nominally accepted by the majority of the Muslim population.55 Later, Al Husyan had 
agreed with the people of Kufa to rebel against Yazid but was later intercepted by 
Yazid’s forces in Karbala while Al Husyan was on his way to Kufa along with his 
family. Although massively outnumbered, Al Husyan had said to have fought heroically 
in the Battle of Karbala and was eventually killed with his family by Yazid’s forces. 
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According to Peter Mandaville, the Battle of Karbala was a decisive moment in the 
emergence of Shi’ism as a separate sect in Islam.56 
iii. The Islamic Political Society and Islamic Jurisprudence 
It is of critical importance to analyze the development of the state and the functions of 
different actors in the ‘Muslim Political Society’ from the Rashidun Caliphate to the 
Ottoman Caliphate as to understand the role Islam plays in modern society. Accordingly, 
as it will be demonstrated throughout this sub-topic, Islam is a unique religion in the 
sense that it is not merely a set of religious ideas and practices; yet throughout its early 
years Islam has led to the creation of a political community that is endowed with a system 
of law that was designed to protect the interests of believers as well as to regulate their 
relationship with other empires. 
According to Mandville, ‘Muslim Political Society’ is described as “interwoven system 
of political and religious authority composed of the caliph, the religious scholars or 
ulama as repositories of religious learning who simultaneously provide a mediating layer 
between the state and society and the institutions and traditions of religious law and 
jurisprudence.”57 
The ulama were influential actors in the ‘Muslim political society’ as they played an 
important role in the formation of the political society. The ulama were Islamic religious 
scholars that were specialized in many branches such as Qur’anic interpretation, 
theology, collection and verification of the Prophet’s Hadith (the saying, norms and deeds 
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of the prophet), the development of fiqh and the establishment of actual court system that 
had a legal system based on Shari’a law.  Hence, Shari’a law was mainly developed by 
different jurists and therefore M. Cherif  Bassiouni and Gamal M. Badr refer to Islamic 
law as a “jurist law” which was unique at the time compared to Roman Law that derive 
laws through legislations by the senate. (Legislative branch)58  According to Toni 
Johnson, shari’a is a God-given law to mankind that acts as a guide to all aspects of 
Muslim life that includes daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial 
dealings.59 
The science of jurisprudence (ulm el fiqh) had begun to develop during the late Ummayad 
period and had led to the creation of different schools and sub-schools of law (madhahib) 
in Islam. In Sunni Islam, there are 4 main schools of law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and 
Hanbali while in Shi’a Islam the most popular school of law is the Ja’afari; all of the 
schools have been named after the scholars that inspired them.60 Shari’a law derives 
primarily from religious sources; the Qur'an and Hadith. Yet, there are also supplemental 
sources such as Ijma (consensus of leading scholars), qiyas (method of analogical 
deduction in reference to the Qur’an or Sunna), maslaha (consideration of the public 
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good), istihsan (reasoning based on the best outcome) and ijtihad (independent judgment 
or interpretation regarding legal matters) 61 
a) Brief Explanation of Twelver Shi’ism: 
In Shi’a Islam, that are three main branches which are the Imami Shi’a(Twelver), 
Ismaili Shi’a (Sevener) and Zayidi Shi’a (Fiver).  The largest of all the Shi’a branches is 
the Twelver Shi’ites while the second largest is the Ismaili Shi’ite. The Shi’a differences 
lies within the disagreement in the line of Imamate. For example, the historical difference 
between the Twelver and Ismaili Shi’a rose after the death of Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq and 
there was a debate between Shiites about the succession of the next Imam. The Ismailis 
Shiites chose to follow Imam Muhammad Bin Isma‘il while the Twelver Shiites chose 
Imam Musa al-Kazim as the successor of Imam Ja’far al Sadiq.62 
The Twelver Shi’a has been divided into two schools of theology and jurisprudence; the 
Usuli (rationalist school) and Akhbari (traditional school). The Usuli depend on ijtihad 
(reasoning) in the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna while the Akhbari refuse the 
idea of ijtihad in Islamic jurisprudence and recognize the tradition of the Imam (Akhbar) 
as the only valid resource for the correct understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunna. The 
Akhbari School used to be the most popular school until the rise of Usuli scholar 
Muhammed Baqir Bihbahani in the 18th century that managed to successfully lead 
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intellectual debates against the Akhbari and had led to the current domination of the Usuli 
school.63 
 The Twelver Shiites highly regard Imam Ali and refer to one of the prophet’s 
hadith “‘I am the city of knowledge and ‘Ali is its gate; so whoever desires knowledge, 
let him enter the gate”64 as an affirmation of Imam ‘Ali’s key role in the history of the 
interpretation of the Qur’an.  Consequently, many of his teachings were preserved in a 
work titled Nahj al-Balagha (‘The Way of Eloquence’). The book has had a foundational 
role in inspiring Shi‘a intellectual and spiritual traditions and gave the Imam a pivotal 
role in Shi’a Islam.  
The martyrdom of Imam Husayn had led to the strengthening of the Shiite loyalty 
towards the family of the prophet (referred to as Ahl al-Bayt) and led to the creation of 
another sect within Islam. The Usuli Twelvers, similarly to most of the Shi’as, believe 
reasoning (ijtihad) is an important tool in jurisprudential thought. However, ijtihad could 
only be exercised by highly qualified religious scholars, which are referred to as 
mujtahids.  The mujtahids would become a major source of authoritative guidance for the 
people on daily issues.65  
b) Brief Explanation of Sunni Jurisprudence: 
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According to Maryam Ishaq al Khalifa, a scholar from Al Azhar University, the 
differences that are found between  the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafei and 
Hanbali) originated from different interpretations and approaches of the companions of 
the prophet and their direct disciples.66 According to Robert Gleave, the main difference 
between the different four Sunni Schools is the extent of use of legal reasoning. The 
schools of Hanafi and Maliki are two schools usually had scholars that favored the use of 
reason (referred to as the people of reason) While the two schools of Shafei and Hanbali  
are followed by the scholars (referred to as people of tradition) that reject the use of 
reason and argued that the Qur’an and Sunna should be taken very seriously while 
decreasing the importance of the use of jurist opinion. Ibn Hanbal even argued that the 
difference between the opinions of scholars is damaging to the unity of the Muslim 
community. 67Therefore, according to Toni Johnson, and Lauren Vriens, the Hanafi 
School is the liberal and most focused on reason and analogy while Hanbali school is 
known to be the most orthodox form of Islam. 68 According to Robert Gleave, the jurists 
had differences in nearly every area of law. However, most scholars were not quite 
concerned about the differences, as they saw it was a "mercy from God" (as prophet 
Muhammed had supposedly made this point himself)69 
iv. A brief introduction to the Origins of Pan Islam 
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In Islam, it is a religious duty for Muslims to maintain their unity and not to engage in 
combat against each other. Consequently, there is more than one verse in the Holy Qur’an 
that stresses on the importance of the unity of Muslims. In Surat Al Imran (the family of 
Imran), God asks Muslims to unite and warns them against division, as He says  “And 
hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah(stretches out for you), and be not divided 
among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah's favour on you; for ye were 
enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and 
ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make 
His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided…Be not like those who are divided 
amongst themselves and fall into disputations after receiving Clear Signs: For them is a 
dreadful penalty”(Verses 3:103-3:105)70 Therefore, Islam is unique in the sense that it 
creates a political system that protects the interests of Muslims, as professor Majid 
Khadduri explains “Islam is not merely a set of religious ideas and practices, but also a 
political community endowed with a system of law designed to protect the collective 
interests of believers as well as to regulate their relations with the outside world”71 
According to Khadduri, in the early days of the Islamic Empire, the Islamic legal theory 
had divided the world into two: Dar al Islam (Pax Islamica) and Dar al Harb (territory of 
war).  Dar al Islam refers to the Islamic and non-Islamic territory that was under Islamic 
sovereignty. The inhabitants of Dar al Islam were considered to be subjects of the Caliph 
and fell under his protection both internally and externally from foreign attacks. While 
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Dar al Harb refers to the rest of the world that weren’t under Islamic sovereignty and in 
theory Dar al Islam was in a state of war with Dar al Harb because the ultimate objective 
of Islam is to spread throughout the world; therefore, Dar al Islam didn’t recognize the 
sovereignty of Dar al Harb.72 However, with the rise of the Ottomans to rule the Islamic 
Empire; there were fundamental changes in the relationship between Muslim and non-
Muslim states. Khadduri notes three fundamental changes in which the Ottoman state 
started to enter peaceful relationships with other nations of different religions, separation 
of religious doctrine from the conduct of external relations and giving more autonomy to 
states under the Ottoman Empire to govern themselves and hence changing the nature of 
the sovereignty from a medieval Islamic universal sovereignty to a territorial sovereignty 
of states.73  
The decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th century and the loss of 
predominantly Muslim territory to foreign powers (such as the loss of Algeria and 
Tunisia to France and Egypt to Great Britain) had alarmed many Muslims that were 
fearful that the European intervention was a new version of the Crusades.74 This had led 
to the rise of movements such as the Young Ottomans that started within the Ottoman 
Empire that called for Islamic Unity and soon spread throughout the Islamic World.75 
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According to Jacob Landau, the 19th century witnessed the rise of scholars that started to 
form a pan-Islamic ideology and advocated it such as Jamal al Din Al Afghani.  Al 
Afghani was one of the most influential writers and major contributors of the Pan-
Islamism ideology. Landau narrates that Al Afghani political ideology had revolved 
around the mobilization of Muslims against European aggression and tyrannical rulers. 
Consequently,  he had reached a conclusion that the only way to stop the European 
powers from invading Muslim lands was by creating a united Islamic World.76 In 
addition, Al Afghani wanted to settle the differences between the Sunnis and the Shi’as 
and to establish a  Muslim bloc that had Ottoman Empire, Persia and Afghanistan as its 
members. Al Afghani saw that the Muslim bloc would play an important role in attracting 
other Muslim states to create a Pan Islamic Union.  
Caliph Abdel Hamid II had throughout his reign tried to promote pan-Islamism in the 
Islamic World. Landau gives examples of policies and actions  that Abdel Hamid II took 
during his reign that can be considered pan-Islamists such as his appointment devout 
Muslims in the upper levels of the state bureaucracy and the Sultan’s court, sending Pan-
Islamic missions (mullahs) to states such as Afghanistan to create a union, using the press 
through Turkish Vakit and Arabic al Jawa’ib newspapers and leaders of the pilgrimage  
to promote pan-Islamism in the Islamic World and reportedly setting up Pan-Islamic 
centres in Tunisia, Shanghai and Java. Even after Abdel Hamid deposition, the Young 
Turks, during World War I, in cooperation with the Germans had published pan-Islamist 
documents in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Tatar, Urdu and Chinese. Direct attention was 
given to Arabic leaders in order to destabilize the Entente powers that occupied Egypt, 
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Tunisia and Algeria at the time; however the British and the French understood the 
strength of pan-Islamism and invested considerable amount of money in order to counter 
its arguments. 
However, Pan Islamism for a short period of time had faded with the Ottoman defeat in 
World War I and the rise of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk that led to the abolishment of the 
Caliphate. Ataturk imposed a secular Western-style civil law in Turkey and had replaced 
Turkish nationalism with Ottomanism. In addition, Turkey had adopted an active 
isolationist foreign policy, according to Hasan Kösebalaban, which distanced itself from 
other Arab and Western States.77 
According to Landau, pan Islamist movements, at various times; seem to concentrate on 
three core ideas: 
a. “The need for a strong central authority to lead Pan Islam and to impose its 
ideology 
b. The rallying of the entire Muslim World to the cause 
c. Total solidarity with the cause, even at the risk of sacrificing personal or local 
interest”78 
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V. Conclusion: 
 This chapter demonstrates the importance of identity in domestic and international 
politics through mostly providing a historical narrative of the formation of the Islamic 
identity in the Middle East. Hence, it is first of vital importance to understand Islam and 
its strong influence on its followers and the development of the Muslim political society 
from the times of Prophet Muhammed until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Even in 
the 20th century, religious identity was still the most probable dominant identity for the 
masses. In Egypt, for instance, an Egyptian sociologist gives an analysis of the political 
behavior of Egyptian villagers in the 20th century in which he notes “for the villagers, the 
world is classified into believers and non-believers on the basis of the Moslem 
faith…they are hardly aware of concepts like race or class”.79 Islam therefore has a strong 
appeal on Muslims and it has resulted in the creation of political movements that had 
aimed to the creation of Islamic states and unions. Consequently, the next chapter will 
focus in depth on the explanation of the role of Shi’ite ideology and the Iranian clerics in 
the formation of the Iranian state. In addition, the role of Wahhabism and the Saudi 
ulama in the formation of the Saudi state and the political roles they both play in the 
state. 
 Yet, before entering into the next chapter, it must be clear to the reader that it is 
wrong to assume that only Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia only use Islam in 
foreign policy. Even secular regimes in the Middle East sometimes use religious 
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institutions to pursue their interests in other foreign nations. According to P.J Vatikiotis, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s secular pan Arab Egypt had resorted sometimes to the use of 
Islam and Islamic institutions to maintain its interest in the region. Consequently, the 
media during the Yemeni-Civil War 1962,  made a distinction between true Islam and the 
reactionary regimes of Saudi Arabia, Imam Ahmad, Badr of Yemen, and  Jordan that 
represented the deviationist Islam of “corruption, reaction, exploitation and tyranny” In 
addition, Al Azhar had a role in promoting Arab nationalism and socialism through the 
use of Islam. Vatikiotis mentioned that Al Azhar had a primary role in exporting the 
Egyptian revolution and its aims to other countries in the Arab and Muslim world and 
claimed that the Egyptian revolution was merely a continuation of Prophet Muhammed’s 
message.80 
 In conclusion, other than Nasser’s Egypt, there are many examples of Middle 
Eastern states that use Islam in foreign policy. However, in the Middle East, possibly two 
states in particular extensively rely on Islam today to pursue their interests, namely Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. 
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Chapter III 
Religion and State Formation 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to show the impact of religion and religious institutions in the 
formation of both the Saudi and Iranian states. This will be done through explaining the 
role of Islamist reformist movements in the Middle East, the history of the Wahhabi 
movement and its role in the Saudi state and the role of Shiism and religious institutions 
in Iranian politics. 
II. The rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East: 
During the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman provinces had witnessed the rise 
of new actors, such as nationalist movements and Islamic reformist movements, that had 
an effect on Ottoman legitimacy in the region; both positively and negatively. For 
instance, the 19th century saw the rise of several nationalist movements in the Balkans 
that called for their independence from Ottoman rule. According to Donald Quataert, he 
argues that separate churches emerged in the Balkans during Ottoman rule, such as the 
Serbian and Bulgarian Churches, which created separate ethnic identities to distinguish 
themselves from Greek or Ottoman rule. 81 Another example is the rise of the Wahhabi 
movement in the 18th century in Najd. The Wahhabi movement, that would later be led 
by the House of Saud, had rose against the Ottomans in the Arabian peninsula; gaining 
control over most of central Arabia by 1805, including Hijaz region (the region that has 
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both the cities of Mecca and Medina)that was an Ottoman province at the time. However, 
the Ottomans responded by requesting Muhammed Ali, the Wali of Egypt at the time, to 
send his army to crush the Wahhabi movement and he had managed to do so successfully 
in 1816.82 Yet, there were also other movements that supported and advocated Ottoman 
legitimacy in the Middle East such as Hizb Al Islah (the Party of Reform) that was set up 
by Ali Yusuf, an Egyptian journalist and politician, in the early 20th century to support 
the Sultan is Pan-Islamic policy.83 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the formation of new nation states in the 
Middle East that were during the early period of their emergence under European 
colonial rule (with the exception of Saudi-Arabia, Turkey and Iran) According to 
Mandaville, most Muslims at the time had a primary goal in which they sought to gain 
independence from European colonial rule, and nationalism proved to be a far more 
attractive suggestion. A further explanation could be given by taking Egypt as an 
example; where after World War I and during the Egyptian revolution of 1919 the urban 
lower classes, that the author described as a religious class that had later in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s developed into becoming members or supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ideology, could only channel their protests through the nationalist 
movements.84  
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However, Islamism had started to develop throughout the mid-twentieth century and has 
sometimes rivaled other secular ideologies such as nationalism and communism in the 
Middle East. Islamism, as defined by Mandaville, “refers to a form of political theory and 
practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense 
of a state whose governmental principles, institutions and legal system derive directly 
from the shari’a”85 The rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East could be further 
explained by analyzing the foundation and development of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt during the 1930’s and 1940’s. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by 
Hassan Al Banna and is considered as one of the oldest Islamists movement in Egypt and 
the Middle East. Al Banna was born to a religious family and throughout his early years, 
he has been exposed to different events that had affected his political and religious 
thoughts such as his experience with anti-colonial movement, being in the Sufi order and 
the realization of the declining religiosity associated with modernization in Egypt.86 
Hence, one of the arguments that Zia Munson discusses in his paper “Social Movement 
Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood” is that modernization and westernization 
in Egypt had led to problems that some believed could be solved by turning to Islamic 
ideals. Munson also gives three other reasons that explain the growth of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1930’s and 1940’s using the political opportunity structure in which 
the status maintained by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,  the decline of the Wafd party 
and the ideological conflict over the creation of Israel; had all played a role in increasing 
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the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood.87 Similarly, like the Muslim Brotherhood, 
other Islamists movements and parties started to rise in the Middle East and each 
movement had developed in its own way its ideology and objective.  
However, it can be also argued as well that the increase in the number of Islamist 
movements in the Middle East can be also attributed to the nature  of the state of both 
Saudi-Arabia and Iran. As it will be demonstrated throughout this paper, both states are 
Islamic in nature and they have been trying to spread their own ideology throughout the 
Middle East to pursue their own interests. Both states have educated, trained and funded 
different kind of Islamist movements throughout the region. Consequently, it is necessary 
to understand the role of religion in both the Saudi state and the Iranian state. In addition, 
the role of religious scholars in decision making, before discussing the foreign policy of 
each state; in order to show the strong Islamic identity that is found within both states. 
III. Islam and the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia: 
i. Religion and the Saudi State: Muhammad  Ibn Abdel Wahhab and the rise 
of Wahhabism  
The ideology of Wahhabism had a very strong significance in the formation of the Saudi 
state .It still continues to provide the Saudi state with the needed legitimacy to rule 
domestically and is considered arguably the most important foreign policy tool that has 
placed Saudi Arabia as a regional power. Furthermore, the Saudi are keen to keep their in 
image as the protector of Islam. Consequently, studying and analyzing the history of 
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Wahhabism is key to understanding the modern Saudi state, the Saudi identity and the 
politics of the country. 
During the 18th century, the Najd region in modern day Saudi Arabia was an independent 
region that was free from Ottoman rule because it mainly had no commercial or religious 
important. Hence, contrary to other Islamist reformists in other Middle Eastern provinces 
; the Islamist reformists in Najd did not arise in response to foreign rule or colonialism. 
Rather, it was because of internal reasons in which they saw was the deterioration of 
Islam. According to Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the Islamist reformists were dissatisfied with 
the practices of some Muslims that included some superstitions or rituals which were 
borrowed from other religions. Consequently, the reformists questioned the faith of such 
people committing such activities; as in their belief that such activities undermine the 
concept of tawhid (Oneness of God) 88 Hence, the Islamic reformists called for the 
adherence to tawhid and placing God at the center of political order. In addition, the 
reformists called for the sociomoral reconstruction of society through the reformation of 
the shari’a law; in which they believed they should exclude the studies of the past 
Muslim scholars of hadith, taqlid  and start their own scholarly writings and 
interpretations in order to find the true meaning of the scriptures. 89 
According to DeLong-Bas, Muhammed Abdel Wahhab , one of the most prominent 
Islamic reformist scholars and the founder of the Wahhabi ideology, was born in Najd in 
1702-1703. Abdel Wahhab was a descendent of a family that had many Hanbali jurists 
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and theologians and had throughout his life been a pious Muslim. Abdel Wahhab notion 
of tawhid, which was derived primarily from the Qur’an and Hadith, became the core 
principle in Wahhabi ideology. He believed that it served as a cure that would lead to the 
re-establishment of a just, powerful and stable society.90 Abdel Wahhab begun his 
preaching in his hometown, yet when his preaching became a threat to the political 
leaders in his hometown; he was forced to leave al-Uyaynah and headed to Mecca for a 
pilgrim. Later, he travelled to Medina in order to proceed with his studies. Abdel Wahhab 
was influenced by two Muslim scholars in particular,  Abdallah  ibn Ibrahim  ibn Sayf  
and Muhammed Hayat El Sindi, and he was especially guided in expanding his 
knowledge in knowing the importance of hadith as a source of scripture, paying attention 
to the content and chains of transmission, opposition to the taqlid, support for ijtihad, and 
the urgent need for sociomoral reform.  Shortly after, Abdel Wahhab moved  to Basra to 
continue his studies under al Muhammed al- Mujmu’i. Abdel Wahhab was opposed to 
Shiism but he specifically targeted one extremist sect the Rafidah. In addition, he 
denounced some of the practices that violated the notion of tawhid.91 Again, Abdel 
Wahhab was forced to leave Basra after their political leaders had felt threatened by his 
growing influence in the region. 
However, Abdel Wahhab’s influence was growing further after his return to Arabia.  His 
most influential book “Kitab El Tawhid” had in a limited time spread throughout the Najd 
region. After a short while, he managed to ally himself with Uthman Bin Hamid Bin 
Muammar, the leader of Abdel Wahhab’s hometown al- Uyaynah . Abdel Wahhab agreed 
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to help Bin Muammar in his vision of expanding his control over the entire Najd region 
while Bin Muammar agreed to support for Abdel Wahhab’s religious teaching.  
The alliance of Abdel Wahhab and ibn Muammar were of vital importance to the growth 
of the ideology of Wahhabism. There are mainly two reasons why the alliance helped the 
growth of Wahhabism in Arabia. First, the alliance created the opportunity for him to 
establish a long lasting relation with Al Saud which eventually led to the creation of 
another alliance between Abdel Wahhab and Al Saud and that led to the creation of the 
modern Saudi state. Second, it created a religious basis for the political movement, and 
hence, his religious vision entered into the realm of political practice. 
However, Abdel Wahhab had entered into a power struggle with the ulama; who were 
deeply threatened by Abdel Wahhab and was accused of heretical and innovative 
teaching. It resulted in the break-down of the Wahhab-Muammar alliance as Muammar 
was threatened by powerful tribe leaders of al-Ahsa and Bani Khaled to either kill or 
expel Abdel Wahhab. Muammar had asked Abdel Wahhab to leave and was escorted into 
al-Dir’iyah. However, during his stay in al-Dir’yah, Abdel Wahhab had managed to 
influence Muhammed Ibn Saud’s wife to accept his message and soon  the entire Al Saud 
family would follow. 
Later in 1744, another alliance was formed between Abdel Wahhab and Muhammed Ibn 
Al- Saud. It was agreed that Abdel Wahhab would be responsible for the religious 
matters while Ibn Saud would be responsible for the military and political issues.  The 
Saudis managed to expand their territory in Arabia despite Ibn Abdel Wahhab opposition 
of using jihad to spread the ideology of Wahhabism. In 1771, Ibn Abdel Wahhab had 
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resigned from his post as imam. 92However, this didn’t prevent the Saud family from 
continuing their expansion across Arabia and  it took them nearly more than a century to 
become an   independent state. 
ii. Religion and the Saudi State: Wahhabism in modern Saudi Arabia 
 
 After a long struggle with the Ottoman Empire and later the Hashemites in the Hegaz 
region; King Abdel Al Aziz Al Saud managed to establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
in 1932. 93 As a newly established state, Saudi Arabia needed to undergo modernization.  
Even though other Middle Eastern states at the time had undergone modernization 
through secular means and while many Middle Eastern countries today still witness a 
secular-Islamist divide; Saudi Arabia presents a different model partly because of the 
Wahhabi ideology that was crucial for Al Saud family to keep as an ideological cover for 
their legitimacy to rule. Therefore, this part shall attempt to explain the influence of 
Wahhabism on the Saudi state and the power of the Wahhabi ulama in the modern Saudi 
Arabian state. 
According to Frank E. Vogel,  the constitution of Saudi Arabia is the shari’a law. The 
shari’a law is the sole formal source of political legitimacy and the common  law of the 
land and thus shari’a is implicated in all politics. Religious scholars are therefore highly 
respected by the Saudis and still earn their sole trust in interpretations of law(fiqh) and 
like Wahabbis hold the belief that true Islam was practiced by the early followers of 
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Islam (salaf) and any other later additions are completely disregarded and accused of 
infidelity.94 
The Saudi political system can be summarized through the explanation of the siyasa 
shar’iyya (shari’a governance). According to the siyasa shar’iyya, there are two 
authoritative holders that uphold religion and politics. The first authoritative holder is the 
religious Wahhabi ulama and their application of law is through religious legal courts. 
While the second authoritative body in Saudi Arabia is composed of the King and his 
government. The shari’a delegates the King the necessary power that makes him able to 
come up with laws that serve public interest so long as it doesn’t conflict shari’a law. 
Therefore, as Vogel mentions, the dual conception of law and its implementation is a pre-
modern legal system which was used previously by Islamic Empires and hence serves as 
constitutional checks and balances and allows compromise between ideal and necessity. 
95 
Therefore, shari’a has a strong influence in shaping of the political life in Saudi Arabia. 
Vogel gives three arguments of how shari’a lends extensive structure to political issues. 
The first argument is that shari’a provides a structure according to which any issue 
occupies a particular space or field within religious discourse. Therefore, shari’a creates 
different expectations when addressing a certain issues such as the relevance of history 
and custom, form of reasoning used and the authority of which an issue lies. Thus, for 
instance, the King is free to regulate any issue that is not mentioned in the Qur’an or 
Sunna under his authority as long as it doesn’t conflict with the norms and principles of 
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shari’a. The second argument is related more to the method used in interpretation of an 
issue. Often, the legal reasoning that is used by of Saudi scholars is controversial to some 
segments of society; such as insisting that women must veil their faces or banning women 
from driving. 96 Recently, Saudi activists have launched a campaign to encourage women 
to defy the drive ban on the 26th of October. The activists claim that there is no single text 
in Islam that prohibits women from driving. 97 However, the Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Al Sheikh, has stated in November 2013 that the ban on 
women driving protects the society of evil.98 The third argument is that shari’a decides 
on the authority to which it assigns jurisdiction over an issue. Hence, private law is under 
the jurisdiction of religious ulama, while political issues are under the jurisdiction of the 
King. Yet, there are hybrid institutions such as and the Agency of Ordering Good and 
Forbidding the Evil in which scholars that are appointed by the King  have full control 
over it and apply fiqh norms while having a partly dispense governing authority. Lastly, 
and more importantly, the shari’a ideas shape the Saudi notion of citizenship; therefore 
the adherence to the Islamic Umma and casting doubt over any other nationality and 
hence in order to become a true Saudi citizen one must be a true Sunni.99 
For more than two centuries, (ever since the alliance of Al Saud and Ibn Abdel Wahhab) 
Saudi Arabia has managed to keep the siyasa shariyya doctrine as its political system and 
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thus giving the religious ulama a large role in dictating the policies of the state as they are 
solely in control of  the basic and common laws.  In addition, the religious ulama play a 
vital role in providing the Saudi monarchy with an ideological cover  and protects them 
from internal and external ideologies that might be a threat to their legitimacy. Yet, even 
though religious ulama are mostly appointed by the King or work in governmental 
institution; the ulama still maintain their independence and are not controlled by the king 
and his government. Therefore, the religious ulamas’ opposition to western secularization 
had sometimes led to opposition of the policies of the king.  The next part will provide 
examples of how the religious ulama managed to remove the political challenge imposed 
by tribalism while maintaining its cultural and social importance for the Saudi monarchy 
and examples that show the ulama’s resistance to westernization in Saudi Arabia which 
reflect its influence through Saudi society. 
The Saudi monarchy considers both religion and tribalism as important pillars in boosting 
its power and maintaining stability in the Saudi Arabia. According to Muhammad Al 
Atawneh  , the ulama were tasked to bridge the differences between Islam and tribalism. 
The Wahhabi  ulama were therefore tasked with removing the political phenomenon of 
tribalism through eradicating the principle tribal values of asabiya, group solidarity based 
on blood kinship and tribal custom which serves as a separate legal system. It is strongly 
evident that the Wahhabi ideology is clearly intolerant to other Islamic and non-Islamic 
ideologies such as Sufism, Shiism, tribalism and nationalism. Al Atawneh gives a 
reference to one of the legal scholarly opinions by Sheikh Salih Al Munjid in which he 
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condemns asabyia as a pre-Islamic practice and that it threatens the unity of the Islamic 
Umma. Hence, according to Munjid:100 
“Tribalism that is appearing nowadays in most countries, where people form factions on the basis of race, 
color, or homeland, is akin to the ancient tribalism that existed between the tribes of Aws and Khazraj; it is 
one of the leftovers of jahiliyya.”101 
In addition, the former mufti of Saudi-Arabia, Abd al Aziz Ibn Baz had illustrated that 
loyalty should only be to Islamic shari’a and their authority holders (the king and ulama) 
Furthermore, if both the ulama or the king were to deviate away from  the universal 
principles of the shari’a; one must not oppose them but guide them. According to Ibn 
Baz: 
“The authority holders are the umaraʾ of the Muslims, who must be obeyed on condition that their decrees 
match the will of God, and do not contradict it. Thus the ʿulamaʾ and umaraʾ must be obeyed in doing 
good, for only in this way will peace and safety reign and will the usurped be saved from the usurper, while 
disobedience will cause anarchy so that the strong will usurp the weak. If, however, the decree is issued 
counter to the will of God, neither ʿulamaʾ the nor the rulers should be obeyed. An example would be a 
decree to drink wine or to deal with usury. However, no opposition must be raised against the rulers, even 
when not fulfilling the shariʿa, but rather they must be advised through ways of tranquility.”102 
As a result, tribal customs such as janbiyya, a punishment in which the accused is struck 
in the head by a sharp instrument, has been prohibited since it contradicts the Islamic 
shari’a. As a result, the Saudi ulama have called upon tribal leaders to avoid political 
tribalism and instead resort to shari’a law. Yet, the ulama have endorsed the tribal 
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shiekhs’ solving disputes as long as it is in accordance with shari’a. The ulama 
succeeded in removing the challenge imposed by tribalism on the Saudi monarchy while 
maintaining the social and cultural aspects of tribalism which was fundamental to keep 
for legitimacy and other purpose such as the recruitment of members of the armed forces 
and police.103 In addition, Chapter 4 will briefly show how the Wahhabi scholars 
managed to use the same methods to increase Saudi Arabian influence in the Muslim 
World. 
In order to analyze the extent of the authoritative power of the Saudi Wahhabi ulama in 
modern day Saudi Arabia; it is important to look at  stat of the ulama in the Saudi 
Arabian Dar Al Ifta institution. The first Ifta institution  of Saudi Arabia was established 
by King Al Saud in 1953 and it was named as Dār al-Iftāʾ walIshrāf ʿalā al-Shuʾūn al-
Dīniyya (Institute for the Issuance of Religion Legal Opinions and the Supervision of 
Religious Affairs)  The creation of the first Ifta institution was a result of the need for 
modernization  and therefore was a part of the bureaucratic and administrative reforms 
that was taken in Saudi Arabia in the 1950’s. In modern Saudi Arabia there are three 
important  institution within the broader Dar Al Ifta : the Grand Mufti, the Board of 
Senior Ulama (BSU) and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal 
Opinion (CRLO). 
The Grand Mufti office was established by King Abdel Aziz in 1952 and the first Mufti 
to be appointed  was Shiekh Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh . However, after the 
death of al-Shaykh in 1969; the position of the Mufti was discontinued until 1993 when 
King Fahd re-established it and appointed Sheikh Abdel-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz as the Grand 
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Mufti of Saudi Arabia. The Mufti mainly has the authority to issue fatwas and  is usually 
the chairman of both the BSU and CRLO. The current Mufti of Saudi Arabia is Abdel 
Aziz Ibn Abdullah Al Shaykh.104 
The BSU was established in 1971 by royal decree from King Faisal. The number of 
members and length of membership of the BSU is not fixed and is usually decided by the 
King. 105Currently, according to the royal decree 71/A issued by King Abdullah in 2013, 
the BSU is composed of 21 members headed by Sheikh Abdel Aziz Ibn Abdullah Al 
Shaykh and that the membership of the ulama in the BSU lasts for four years. 106 .  
According to the 1971 royal decree , the role of the BSU is “to issue legal opinions, based 
on the Sharīʿa, on matters submitted by the King (walī al-amr), and to act as an advisory 
body in Common Law issues, to facilitate the King’s decisions.”107 While it seems that 
the decisions of the BSU are only advisory; yet its decisions in many cases were 
converted  to state laws with the King’s approval. Al Atawneh provides several 
examples, one of which is the issue of deposition divorce (khul’).108 In addition, the 
CRLO acts as  branch of the BSU and  its main function is to prepare research for BSU 
discussions and the issuance of fatwas in the matters of faith , worship  or transactions. 
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The Wahhabi  ulama have an important political and social role in which they are able to 
maintain the siyasa sharyyia method of rule. The Wahhabi ulama’s role in politics is 
usually indirect yet of great importance.  Al Atawneh uses three examples in Saudi 
history that illustrate the political importance of the ulama. The first example was the 
issuance of a fatwa by the BSU in 1979 after a religious fundamentalist group had taken 
over the Kaaba. The fatwa denounced the religious fundamentalist group stating that their 
acts were against the shari’a as the fundamentalists have violated  the sacredness of the 
Kaaba, created bloodshed in the Haram (Kaaba) and in the month of Muharra (the 
shari’a forbids Muslims to fight in the sacred month of Muharram and in the Kaaba)gave 
permission to the authorities for the use of weapons on sacred premises (which is strictly 
forbidden in Mecca and Medina)  and opposing the leader of Muslims (Saudi King) 
despite of their allegiance. Therefore, the fatwa bolstered the legitimacy of the King and 
gave permission to the authorities to use weapons in the sacred Haram to combat the 
fundamentalist. The second example was the fatwa issued by the BSU that gave 
permission to the Saudi monarchy to allow the stationing the US troops in Saudi Arabia 
during the Gulf War in 1991. The fatwa was so controversial that it led to the objection of 
many scholars and the rise of new Islamist groups in Saudi Arabia such as the Sahwi and 
the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). The scholars demanded 
from the chairman of  and the King several reforms to be taken in the Kingdom. While 
there were several reforms that were taken after the rise of a new opposition such as re-
establishing the office of the Grand Mufti and the establishment of the Consultative 
Council; the opposition members were arrested. The BSU had issued a communique 
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denouncing the CDLR which would later result into a crackdown on the movement.109 
The communique stated that: 
“ The Board [BSU] finds the behavior of those who signed the document [of CDLR] 
strange. The Board unanimously denounces this organization [CDLR] as illegitimate, 
because Saudi Arabia is a country that rules according to Islam. Islamic courts are 
spread across the country and no one has been prevented from complaining about any 
injustice to the specified agencies or to the ombudsmen.”110  
As previously mentioned, the Saudi Wahhabi ulama had manage to a large extent resist 
secular modernization in Saudi-Arabia and have sometimes challenged the King in some 
of the reforms that were undertaken. An example could be seen, as according to David 
Commins, in the creation of Islamic religious universities in order to counter balance the 
secular universities in Riyadh and the Arab World. Another was the structural change of 
the commercial courts in the late 1960’s. The commercial courts were secular courts that 
were under the Ministry of Commerce. However, in 1968 the ulama had managed to win 
a concession in gaining equal representation in these courts and by 1969 they dominated 
the commercial commissions enforcing statutory regulations.111 The Wahhabi ulama have 
also resisted the King’s attempt to codification of the fiqh, initiatives to reform the 
judiciary and the widening of the masaa  (in the Holy Kaaba) are in Mecca.112 
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iii. Conclusion 
The role of religion in maintaining order and stability in Saudi Arabia is of crucial 
importance. It is a major components of Saudi identity , as previously mentioned before, 
that being Saudi is strongly related to the Wahhabi definition of being a true Sunni 
Muslim ; which is following the Salafi tradition(early followers of Islam).As Sheikh Al 
Munjid says: 
“To say that the Salafi (Wahhabi) movement resembles any other Islamic movements is wrong. The Salafi 
movement is the only one that must be followed by adopting its approach, joining it, and performing jihad 
with it. Therefore, Muslims are not permitted to follow any other movement, since they all are straying 
movements.”113 
It can be argued that Al Munjid’s explanation of the sole adherence to the Wahhabi 
ideology partially explains Saudis’ resistance to foreign ideologies internally and 
externally; as Wahhabism strongly rejects other Islamic movements or sects such as 
Sufism and Shiism or secular ideologies such as Pan-Arab nationalism. Hence, the threat 
of one ideology had led the Saudi regime to place a strong emphasis on spreading the 
Wahhabi ideology abroad (as will be explained later in Chapter 5).  
In addition, the use of religion has maintained the ‘siyasa shariyya’ model and  has kept 
the Al Saud-Ibn Wahhab agreement for more than two centuries. While it is debated by 
some scholars such as Ayman al-Yassini, author of the book Religion and State in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arab, that the ulama have recently declined in power because of the 
increasingly bureaucratization and westernization of the Saudi government; it can be 
argued that it is very to measure the degree of power of the ulama due to the that have 
incorporated in government and therefore it’s possible that they have become influential 
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within the government and the fact that the distribution of power through siyasa shariyya  
was never clear.  However, the ulama still play a role in shaping Saudi society and 
culture through their issuance of fatwas and their close interaction with society. The 
ulama have maintained the pre-modern Islamic role of mediating between the King and 
his people. Therefore, the relationship between the King and the ulama is mutually 
beneficial in which the ulama play a pivotal role in providing legitimacy to the King 
while the King‘s role is to preserves the Wahhabi ideals through the consultation of 
ulama.  114 
IV. Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
i. Religion and the state: History of Iran and the Iranian Revolution of 
1979 
While rise of Islam was under prophet Muhammed (pbuh) in modern day Saudi Arabia; 
the religion of Islam had spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa. By the 7th 
century, Caliph Umar Ibn Khattab managed to defeat and ends the Sassanid rule over 
Persia. For centuries after the conquest of Persia, the majority of Muslims in Iran were 
Sunni for several ruling dynasties. However, with the Mongol invasion of Iran; most of 
the Muslim Sunni political power were destroyed and thus led to the rising of Shiite 
political forces. 115According to Roger Savoury, the rise of the Safavids dynasty in Iran 
had led to the conversion of most of the Muslims to Shiism . In 1501, Shah Ismail I had 
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declared  Twelver Shiism as the state religion. At that time, two third of the population in 
Tabriz was composed of Sunni Muslims. The Shah gave a speech in  Tabriz in the name 
of the Twelve Imams and the call of prayers had added the words of ‘I bear witness that 
Ali is beloved of God.116  The Shah at the time was afraid from the reaction of the Sunnis 
and therefore he had threatened those that would oppose him, as he said “if the people 
utter one word of protest, I will draw the sword and leave not one of them alive”. The city 
of Tabriz had put no resistance to the Shah and had accepted the conversion to Shiism. 
However, most of the Sunni ulama’s had feared Ismail’s death threat and therefore fled 
the region while those that  refused were killed. According to Savoury, the Shah’s move 
to declare Twelver  Shiism as the official religion of the Safavid state was made for 
mainly two political gains. Firstly, the Shah was worried of his political rivals the 
Ottomans and therefore wanted to have a different political identity that would separate it 
from the powerful Sunni states. Secondly, the Shah claimed that he was a representative 
of the Mahdi and therefore giving himself some sort of a divine right.117  
However, during the 19th and 20th century under the Qajar dynasty and later the Pahlavi 
dynasty; Iran underwent several secular modernization reforms. In addition, Iran was 
occupied and divided between the British and the Russians during the First and Second 
World War. Yet, it was during the reign of Muhammed Reza Shah, the ruler of Iran from 
1941-1979, that Iran had followed a pro-Western and an anti-communist policy. The 
Shah had faced opposition during the implementation of the ‘White revolution’ in the 
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1960’s from the National Front and the religious institutions. However, the Shah used the 
SAVAK (secret police-established in 1957) to crackdown on any opposition movement. 
Nonetheless, political tensions were on the rise in Iran in the late 1970’s; as according to 
Elton Daniel, there were two main reasons behind the rising unpopularity of the Shah’s 
regime. The first was the economic crisis that had hit Iran in the late 1970’s and the 
growing opposition towards the SAVAK. Yet, the first spark that ignited the Iranian 
Revolution was an article published in a semi-official newspaper in January 7th 1978 that 
accused the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader from 1979-
1989, of being a British spy. The article led to a series of mass demonstrations in the city 
of Qom and while the Shah had introduced economic and political reforms in order to 
maintain stability; it would not last as Iran was in a pre-revolutionary state. Later, a fire 
broke out in Rex Cinema in the city of Abadan that led to the death of 400 people. 
Rumors spread throughout Iran that claimed that the SAVAK were responsible for the 
fire in order to frame the religious institution. This led to a series of demonstrations 
throughout Iran and resulted in the Shah declaring martial law. On 8th September 1978, a 
massive demonstration was held in Tehran, calling for the removal of the Shah and the 
return of Ayatollah Khomeini. The demonstration became excessively violent as the army 
and armed civilians engaged in combat in what became known as Black Friday. A series 
of demonstrations and protests continued afterwards and eventually led the army to refuse 
to take part in cracking down on the Iranian demonstrations. Thus, in January 1979 the 
Shah fled to Egypt with Ayatollah Khomeini returning to Iran in February 1979.118 
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The 1979 Iranian Revolution led to the establishment of an Islamic state in Iran. In order 
to understand the current Islamic identity of the people of Iran; the study of Khomeini 
and his ideology is relatively important. Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini was born 
in  1902 near Qom to a family of clerics and landowners and is one of the descendants of 
the Shiite Imam Mousa Al Kasim (7th Imam) Khomeini received a traditional religious 
education where he would later become a student of Grand Ayatollah Aqa-Hosayn 
Boroujerdi. Khomeini was opposed to secularization and it was clear his first book 
‘Revealing of Secrets’ (Kashf Al Asrar) in which he defended traditional Islam and was 
against the drinking of alcohol, music and the mixing between men and women. 
However, according to Elton Daniel, it wasn’t until the death of the Grand Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi that Khomeini became more politically active which resulted into his exile to 
Iraq in 1964. Yet in Iraq, Khomeini managed to create a network of supporters in Iran 
and they later rose to become political elites of the new Islamic Republic of Iran; the 
current Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was one of Khomeini’s 
students.119  
The revolutionary idea of an Islamic state was introduced by Khomeini in the 1970s in 
Najaf in which he came up with a new theocratic governance rule called Wilayet al Faiqh 
(Guardianship of Jurists) According to Hamid Mavani, , the concept of Wilayet al Faqih 
is to provide the Islamic jurists with authority to run the affairs of the state and interpret 
Islamic rulings on matters on numerous fields such as the social realm, personal affairs 
and devotion until the reappearance of the 12th Imam in which he would safeguard the 
Islamic state. Khomeini’s in the beginning wanted an Islamic state that is ruled by the 
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general principles of the shari’a and headed by qualified jurisconsult. However, before 
his death in 1988, he expanded the authority of jurisconsult in which he gave them 
authority to bypass shari’a law if it conflicts with society’s best interests.120 The political 
system of Iran will be explained in more details later in this chapter. 
Khomeini managed to gain public support for his revolutionary ideas for many reasons 
including the increasing appeal of Shiite traditionalism to the Iranian people and the 
charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini. According to Said Amir Arjomand,, the 1960’s and 
1970’s witnessed a period of Islamic resurgence where Shiite traditionalism became a 
trend in Iran. Arjomand backs his analysis through providing more than one evidence 
such as the increasing number of religious association in 1970s, the increasing number of 
religious publishers all over Iran, the increase in number of pilgrims to Mecca and visits 
to religious shrines and lastly in 1973 the two best-selling books were the Qur’an 
(700,000 copies) and Mafatih El Jenan (Key to Heaven, 450,000 copies) Therefore, with 
the increasing popularity of Shiite traditionalism; Khomeini found support for his 
message through political Islamic associations such as  ‘Hey’at-e Mo’talefeh-ye Eslami’ 
and instant clerical journalism. In addition, Khomeini’s charisma was crucial for the 
success of the Iranian revolution and the Islamization of the state. The acclamation of 
Khomeini as Imam by his followers in 1970 (which had not been acclaimed to anyone 
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since the sixteenth century) had given him the power needed to oust the shah and 
eliminate competition after the revolution from secularists and religious opposition.121  
Ayatollah Khomeini had also envisioned exporting the Iranian Islamic revolution far 
beyond Iran and favored an Islamic rule in Muslim majority states.. According to David 
Menashri, associate professor of Middle Eastern and African History in Tel Aviv 
University, Khomeini during his exile in Iranian the 1960’s advocated for Islamic Unity 
and didn’t differentiate between Sunnis and Shi’as “Our movement is for an Islamic goal, 
not for Iran alone.. Iran has [only] been the starting point”122 Furthermore, Khomeini had 
elaborated his position about the Sunni-Shiite divide during an interview in Paris  
“Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if 
they live in regions remote from one another... This is important and basic point. This is 
the strategy…Being Shi’i or Sunni is not the question.”123 
ii. Religion and the State: The Political Model of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
a) The Islamic Republic’s Political System 
As previously mentioned, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Wilayet al Faqih is a unique and 
relatively new  governance model that is not found  in traditional Shiite or Sunni 
jurisprudence. Therefore, Iran is currently the only Muslim country that is ruled by 
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jurisconsult. The Supreme Leaders in Iran enjoy an enormous amount of power as they 
have control over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches. According to Bahman 
Baktiari, , article 4 of the Iranian Islamic Constitution states that all laws and regulations 
must be in accordance with shari’a law.124  The Iranian political system is hybrid and 
complex because it mainly mixes democratic and theocratic values. 
The Iranian political system has six important bodies ; the most powerful is that of the 
Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is an unelected official that serves for life and is 
appointed by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts is an elected body 
composed of 86 members that are elected every eight years. The role of the Assembly is 
to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Leader; even though they have not so far used their 
power in dismissing any of the Supreme Leaders before.125 The Supreme Leader has the 
authority to appoint six members of twelve of the Council of Guardians; the six members 
are clergymen. The other six members of the Council of Guardians are jurists that are 
nominated by the judiciary and approved by the Majlis (parliament) The Council of 
Guardians are responsible for deciding whether legislation is in compliance with the 
shari’a law and the constitution and the Council have the right to veto a legislation if it 
conflicts with shari’a law or the constitution. However, if the Majlis insists that  the 
legislation is necessary and serves the broader interest of the people; another body, the 
Expediency Discernment Council, reviews if the legislation serves the larger interest of 
the Islamic system. In addition, members of the Expediency Discernment Council are 
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selected by the Supreme Leader. In 2005, the Supreme Leader delegated the Expediency 
Discernment Council supervisory powers over all branches of government.126 The Majlis 
is Iran’s legislative body and it is composed of  290 members that are elected every four 
years. The Supreme Leader must approve of all candidates before running for elections. 
The Majlis has the authority to draft legislation, summon or impeach a minister or 
president and approve the national budget.  Lastly, the President of Iran is responsible for 
running the executive body such as managing the economic policies and national and 
international affairs. The president is elected through popular vote and serves a 
presidential term of four years and a sitting president can hold only two consecutive 
terms. However, the Supreme Leader must approve of the candidates before running in 
elections. The Supreme Leader also appoints the head of the judiciary and is the Supreme 
Commander of the Iranian Armed Forces. 127 
b) The Islamic Republic’s Ideological Shift 
One of the challenges that faced the Islamic Republic in the beginning was the dichotomy 
found between the Iranian identity with the Islamic identity. According to Alam Saleh, 
Iranian national identity was artificially constructed by Iranian historians and elitist 
during the mid-nineteenth century. Qajar intellectuals were influenced by European 
nationalism and orientalism and therefore historians and intellects reconstructed Iranian 
national identity to be based on pre-Islamic Persia and Aryanism. The reconstruction of 
Iranian ideology was favored by the nationalist government in Iran during the Pahlavi 
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rule. Accordingly, secularist elitists adopted an anti-Islamic and anti-Arab approach as 
they blamed them for the destruction of the ancient Persian Empire and called for the 
revival of Aryan glory and promoted Persian superiority. 128This was clearly evident in 
one of Jamshid Amuzegar’s, former Prime Minister of Iran, speeches where he said  
“We were invaded by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks, but we did not lose our 
originality”129 
However, as Alam Saleh notes, the Iranian national identity structure is based on anti-
other sentiments and a shared hatred of neighboring states; which was a bit problematic 
since other ethnic Iranians were transnational and share a common identity with 
neighboring state. Nevertheless, Khomeini and Iranian Islamic intellects managed to a 
great extent, with the help of external factors, to merge both ideologies and prevent an 
identity crisis or division within his supporters. Khomeini managed to eliminate political 
rivals including the secular nationalists, liberals and Islamists and clergymen that 
opposed Khomeini by April 1983. In addition, the regime relied on using anti-
imperialism as a source of bolstering its own unity. The Iranian government had also 
used Friday Prayer Imams to increase its own legitimacy and spread its own ideology. 
Arjomand uses a speech given by former President Khamenei in the 1980’s that shows 
the importance of Friday Imam’s to the success of the Islamic revolution as he says that 
the Imams are "the great pillars of the Revolution, the speaking tongue of the Leader and 
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the strong arm of general mobilization.”130 The Iranian government also relied on Islamic 
propaganda;  which according to Arjomand was considerably effective on youth.  In 
1982, the Ministry of Education had 70,000 existing teachers familiarized with Islamic 
ideology and were joined by 18,000 newly trained the following year. Furthermore, the 
Iranian government created political-ideological bureaus that were attached to all 
governmental institutions to ensure ideological commitment and knowledge of Islam. 
131Lastly, the Iraqi invasion of Iran had led to the unification of Iranians against Saddam 
Hussein, former President of Iran, and the Iranian government had used propaganda by 
stressing the importance of maintaining Iranian territory and used Shi’a ideological terms 
such as martyrdom to mobilize the people. In 1987, Khomeini stated that Iran was 
fighting for a divine cause.132 In addition, earlier in the war the clergymen’s distribution 
of plastic keys that symbolized keys to paradise, as Tim McGirk, narrates the story of 
Iranian guide Merhdad in the Iraqi-Iran war: 
“It was made in China, of plastic[keys]. The mullahs told us that the key would open the 
door to a golden palace with hundreds of rooms and a beautiful virgin in each room. You 
see, we were facing certain death — the Iraqis had poison gas. Like hundreds of 
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thousands of young conscripts in the Iran-Iraq war, Mehrdad was destined for a suicidal 
human-wave charge on the Iraqi lines”133 
In 2001, a poll by the World Values Surveys questioned Iranians what would best 
describe them in terms of identity. 61% of Iranians identified themselves as Muslims 
while only 34.1% identified themselves as Iranians. While there are no previous figures 
to measure the level of change; yet the figures shows the impact that religious 
propaganda has made on Iranians.134 
c) Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
In the early years of the Iranian Islamic, Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to maintain unity 
within his supporters and therefore created a single party that dominated politics in called 
the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) The IRP was a conservative political party that was 
created to meet the goals of the revolution.  Before Khomeini’s death, in 1987, the IRP 
was dissolved after it had met the goals of the revolution.135  Currently, there are  three 
major players in Iranian politics: pragmatists, reformists and hardliners.   
The pragmatists movement appeared straight after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
According to Saeed Barzin, the pragmatist view on good governance is that of a populist 
government that is administrated by bureaucrats in cooperation with the clergy. 
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Therefore, the pragmatists see the clergy as senior partners in ruling the state rather than 
being their superiors. In addition, Pragmatists stress on the importance of using 
rationalism and debate in politics. In addition, pragmatists view international relation in a 
realist manner and therefore prefer the use of power politics in analyzing foreign 
relations. Therefore, they have little interest in viewing international relations as moral or 
revolutionary.136 One of the most prominent pragmatist Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a 
cleric, became the president of Iran from 1989-1997.  During his presidency, Rafsanjani 
introduced certain liberalizing reforms and focused mainly on the developing the 
economy and reconstructing Iran after the costly Iraqi-Iran war. In addition, Rafsanjani 
allowed more debates in the Iranian media and ‘Majlis ‘and allowed for policies and 
initiatives to be openly criticized. 137  
The reformist movement appeared in the 1990’s and was developed by former deputy 
minister of intelligence Saeed Hajjarian; who is considered the theoretician of reform. 
The reformist believed that change was necessary and could only be achieved through 
reform. Abbass Abdi, one of the most influential Iranian reformists, gives an explanation 
how the movement defines reform; as he states "the aim of reform was not to limit the 
power of Velayat e faqih (the rule of the jurist) but rather to make it accountable and 
answerable to law”138 Negin Nabavi, argues that reformists are liberals at their best with 
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no specific paradigm and a few set rules.139  Mohammed Khatami, theologian and the 
president of Iran 1997-2005, was a reformist that tried to bring about change and 
liberalization into Iranian politics. According to Mandville, Khatami was opposed to 
clerical dominance. Khatami’s introduction of liberal reforms included the appointment 
of the first Iranian female as a vice-president, encouraging the growth and activity of civil 
society. In addition, he opened up a sufficient space for youth reformists to be seen 
around the world. 140Lastly, Khatami tried to improve the relationship of Iran with 
western countries; most notably the United States. In an interview with CNN, Khatami 
emphasized the importance of a “dialogue of civilizations”, as he states: 
“In terms of the dialogue of civilizations, we intend to benefit from the achievements and 
experiences of all civilizations, Western and non-Western, and to hold dialogue with 
them. The closer the pillars and essences of these two civilizations are, the easier the 
dialogue would become. With our revolution, we are experiencing a new phase of 
reconstruction of civilization. We feel that what we seek is what the founders of the 
American civilization were also pursuing four centuries ago. This is why we sense an 
intellectual affinity with the essence of the American civilization.”141 
However, Khatami’s reforms were limited due to the struggle with the clerical 
establishment and the conservatives; as the clerical establishment began a series 
crackdown and arrests of pro-reformists. For example, legal action was taken against a 
pro-reformist mayor in 1998 , reformists’ publishing houses were closed. In addition, 
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while Iran helped the United States in its war against the Taliban; the United States 
labelled Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’.142 
Lastly, Islamist rightist  attempted to preserve the power of the clergymen and 
usually use anti-imperialist rhetoric to gain support. The hardliners opposed 
liberalization, improving relations with the US and individual rights to privacy as 
opposed to having a ‘moral police’143  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former Iranian president 
from 2005-2013, an engineer that was slightly different from the traditional 
conservatives.  Ahmadinejad used populist revolutionary nationalism to appeal to the 
poor; promising them an improved standard of living. Ahmadinejad also gained a lot of 
support through his anti-Western rhetoric; mostly notably the holocaust denial, as he 
stated “They have created a myth in the name of the Holocaust and consider it above 
God, religion and the prophets," 144   
iii. Conclusion 
While in Saudi Arabia it’s quite complicated to illustrate the power of the ulama in the 
Saudi politics; it is clearly obvious that in Iran the religious clergymen are in power and 
that they are the main authority in Iran. In addition, while there are some challenges that 
had face the clergymen since the creation of the Islamic Republic; most recently the 
demands of liberal movements in Iran for more freedom and liberty; the clergymen have 
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succeeded in oppressing such movements. An example can be demonstrated in looking at 
the green movement, a movement that started in June 2009 as protest to Ahmadinejad’s 
victory in the election. The green movement organized mass demonstration and called for 
civil disobedience until its crackdown in February 2010.145 Iran’s Shiite ideology had 
given it the essential legitimacy to survive until today and it had given it influence over 
many Arab states and Shiite communities in other regions. 
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Chapter IV 
Religion and Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to show the role of religion in Saudi foreign policy and how the Saudi 
state was able to use identity in order to eliminate rival ideologies such as Arab 
nationalism and communism. It also shows how the ideological development of 
fundamental extremist movements that were funded by Saudi Arabia and how it back-
fired against the interests of Saudi Arabia. 
According to the ‘siyasa sharyyia’ doctrine, foreign policy lies under the responsibility of 
the King. However, throughout the past few decades, Islam has been widely used in 
Saudi foreign policy. The purpose was to maintain Saudi’s prestigious status in the 
Islamic World and to preserve their own Wahhabi state ideology in an effort to protect 
the Al Saud monarchy from external ideological threats such as communism and Arab 
nationalism. As previously mentioned in the first chapter, Saudi Arabia considers itself as 
the ‘Heartland of Islam’ and justifies that it has kept Islam ‘uncontaminated’ because it 
has not been subject to colonial or foreign rule.  According to Bahgat Korany and Moataz 
Abdel Fattah, Islam and oil are the two pillars of Saudi foreign policy.146  Further 
evidence of this has been of feud by Prince Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, 
former ambassador to the United States,  as he explained why Saudi Arabia should not be 
worried about the recent developments in the region; he state: 
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“Why is the Kingdom confident? For a number of reasons. Saudi Arabia is the cradle of 
Islam, a religion that today has an estimated 1.2 billion adherents. Saudi Arabia 
represents over 20 percent of the combined GDP of the Middle East-North Africa (and an 
estimated quarter of the Arab World's GDP, according to the latest IMF numbers), 
making it the economic engine of the region an effective partner and member of the G-
20.”147 
Furthermore, both Korany and Abdel Fattah show the importance of the religious ulama 
in Saudi’s foreign policy. For example , in 2002 where a fatwa was issued by Grand 
Mufti Ibn Baz placing Israel in the category of dar al-ahd (covenant states) rather than 
dar al-harb (war states) which allowed crown-Prince Abdallah to offer a peace treaty 
with Israel in the Arab Summit meeting in Beirut. In addition, both authors argued that 
the religious ulama have on occasions had more influence on the masses than the heads 
of their governments. 148 
 This chapter will discuss two particular cases where Saudi Arabia extensively used 
religion to promote its influence and identity and limit other ideological threats. The first 
case will analyze pan-Islamism in the first Arab Cold War and the second case will look 
at the creation of Jihadist movements in Afghanistan. In addition, this chapter will 
attempt to address the challenges that face the Saudi monarchy. 
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II. The Arab Cold War and the foundation of Saudi Pan Islamism:  
i. The threat of Pan-Arabism 
The Arab Cold War was a term coined by Malcom Kerr, to describe the inter-Arab 
conflict that symbolized by the rivalry between the United Arab Republic and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the late 1950’s and 1960’s. The conflict between the 
two regimes had split the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) into two camps; 
revolutionary Arab states that adopted a pan-Arab identity and the conservative 
monarchies that were determined to deter Arab nationalism. In addition, the Arab Cold 
War became a part of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States; with 
the Soviets supporting Egypt and its allies and the United States supporting the Saudi 
monarchy. The ideology of Arab nationalism threatened Al Saud’s power and therefore 
the Saudi monarchy reacted by using pan-Islamism; an ideology that would later prove 
fruitful to Saudi foreign policy. 
The Arab Cold War started shortly after Gamal Abdel Nasser became the President of 
Egypt in 1954. Abdel Nasser was one of the founding members of the Free Officer 
Movement; the movement that managed to overthrow King Farouk I through a coup 
d’état in 23rd July 1952. According to Joel Gordon, professor of history at the University 
of Arkansas, after the 1952 coup,  Nasser was largely in control of the Free Officer 
Movement. In addition, even though Mohamed Nagib was the president of Egypt at the 
time; Nasser’s popularity was rising among the people, as Gordon narrates “By the end of 
the "March crisis" Gamal Abd al-Nasser had clearly emerged to the public eye as the 
revolution's real leader...He appeared frequently in the press and was caricatured on the 
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cover of popular picture magazines as the personification of the new Egypt: pyramid 
builder, armor-shield against reactionary terror, football hero."149  
Nasser’s influence grew tremendously in Egypt and the Arab World after rising to power. 
He used an anti-imperialist, socialist and pan-Arab rhetoric to strengthen his legitimacy 
and to spread his influence throughout the Arab World. The Middle East was going 
through a period of decolonization and Egypt had played an important role in assisting 
liberation movements in Arab and African states (most notably in Algeria) Nasser 
believed in the influence of the media and, therefore, he established a radio station, Sawat 
Al Arab (Voice of the Arabs); which was influential in broadcasting pan-Arab messages 
and publicizing liberation struggles in the Arab and African World.150 Nasser’s call for 
Arab unity was so influential that it inspired other Arabs to dream about a unified Arab 
nation. He believed that Arab unity would help achieve glory and would defend Arab 
states against aggressors, as he states in a speech in July 26th 1957 “Our policy is based 
on Arab nationalism because Arab nationalism is a weapon for every Arab state. Arab 
nationalism is a weapon employed against aggression. It is necessary for the aggressor to 
know that, if he aggresses against any Arab country, he will endanger his interests”151 
Nasser’s policies such as reaching an agreement with Britain in 1954 to evacuate Egypt 
and later the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 had led him to become an Arab 
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Hero.152 However, Nasser’s peak of influence was reached in 1958 ; as he managed to 
successfully unite with Syria creating the United Arab Republic. In addition, Nasser’s 
anti-Baghdad campaign had paid off as in 1958 the Free Officer Movement in Iraq had 
overthrown the British installed monarchy ; ending the Baghdad Pact.153 According to 
Salem Yaqub, , in 1958 the Eisenhower administration admitted defeat in taking a tough 
stance against Nasser.154 
The Al Saud monarchy was therefore deeply threatened by Nasser’s rising power and his 
revolutionary pan-Arab ideology. At the beginning of Nasser’s reign, Saudi Arabia 
maintained good relationships with Egypt;  as both states signed a mutual defense 
agreement in 1954. In addition, Saudi Arabia halted oil exports to Britain and France 
during the Suez Crisis as a response to their aggression against Egypt in 1956. Nasser’s 
public reception in Saudi Arabia worried the Saudi monarchy while his proposal for a 
unity between Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt was rejected. The Saudi monarchy viewed 
that Nasser’s pan-Arab socialist ideology wasn’t compatible with their rule of Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudi monarchy was also dissatisfied with Egypt’s use of Saudi opposition 
to broadcast anti-Saudi sentiments. However, the situation escalated when a plan for 
overthrowing the Saudi monarchy by the Egyptian officers was foiled. 155 
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In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Saudi Arabia witnessed several domestic problems 
that threatened the legitimacy of Al Saud. In 1956, King Saud faced mass protests in 
Dhahran, a Shiite majority city, as workers called for reform, closure of the Dhahran 
airbase and labor rights. In Najd, Saudi’s first student organization called for reform and 
demanded the dissolution of the ‘General Presidency for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice’. Furthermore, there were divisions and power struggles within the 
Royal family. King Saud and Faisal competed for power while a group of young princes 
called for reforming the entire Saudi system. Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, 
inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser pan-Arab ideology, created the Free Prince movement 
that demanded the creation of a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia. Prince Talal 
later formed the Arab Liberation Front which called for democracy, the abolition of 
slavery, overhaul of oil concessions and Arab unity against western imperialism.156 
ii. Saudi Pan-Islamism 
As a result, the Saudi monarchy became increasingly aware of the need to contain Nasser 
and his Arab nationalism ideology as it threat against the Kingdom mounted. Nasser’s 
brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the assassination attempt by 
one of its members in 1954 had led members of the Muslim Brotherhood to find refuge in 
Saudi Arabia and other gulf states. According to Angel Rabasa, members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia mainly worked as Imams in mosques, teachers and even 
officials in the Ministry of Education where they became responsible for designing 
textbooks and syllabi. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in Saudi Arabia 
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led the movement to become an agent of change in Wahhabism as they managed to 
spread their teachings throughout the Muslim World, and gave political inspiration to the 
rise of jihadist movements.157 Therefore, two pan-Islamist organizations appeared in the 
1960’s: the Muslim World League and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. 
iii. Muslim World League (MWL) 
In May 1962, King Faisal established the Muslim World League, based in Mecca, in an 
attempt to counter pan-Arabism, socialism, communism, and to promote Islamism. The 
Muslim World League was a non-profit religious organization that aimed at funding 
education, publications and Islamic cultural centers. The World Muslim League did not 
only spread the Wahhabi ideology in the Arab region but also exported it throughout the 
Islamic World. The League for instance supported groups such as Deobandis, Ahl-i 
Hadith and Jamaati Islami in South Asia that aimed at combating Sufism. In addition, the 
Izala Society movement in Nigeria was created with the aim of wiping out ritual 
innovations.158 
The launching of the Muslim World League started with the meeting of 111 ulama who 
were later joined by political activists. The League used the mosques under its 
supervision and control for religious education and preaching for Islam.159 In addition, 
the League distributed religious books and provided scholarship opportunities in Saudi 
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religious universities.160 In addition, the Muslim World League managed to pressure 
states into giving more support for Muslim causes. The Muslim World League also had 
its own publications such as Majallat Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (journal of the Muslim 
World League) in which they aimed to spread awareness about Muslim struggles to 
strengthen pan-Islamism solidarity. According to Thomas Hegghammer, the Muslim 
World League began largely apolitical; as it was more focused on establishing charity 
and development funds which worked on humanitarian aid and development of 
education.161  
Later in 1972, the Saudis also established the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) that focused on raising awareness of the new generation against ‘false 
ideologies’ such as communism and pan-Arabism.162 The WAMY spread through 65 
states and its staff often exhibited extremist ideologies.163 According to Commins, the 
WAMY distributed Muslim Brotherhood works of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al Qadir 
Awda.164 Such movements led to the creation of  new fundamental Wahhabi and global 
jihad movements through the late 1970’s and 1980’s. 
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iv. Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) 
According to Madawi Al Rasheed, , King Faisal used Pan-Islamism for three main 
purposes ; to promote inter-governmental cooperation, counter pan-Arabism, communism 
and contain the Soviet threat, and mobilization of Muslim countries for the Palestinian 
cause. 165 While Faisal established the Muslim World League; yet the league only worked 
on a grass root societal level and hence he needed another inter-governmental 
organization in order to reduce Nasser’s influence in the Arab World. By 1969, Egypt’s 
role in the Arab World had declined  as a result of the defeat of Arab troops by Israel in 
the Six-Day War in 1967. In addition, Nasser’s intervention in Yemen was, as he 
admitted, his own ‘Vietnam’.  Therefore, Faisal took advantage of Nasser’s weakness and 
called for a Islamic Summit after the  burning of Al Aqsa Mosque in 1969. 166 According 
to Landau, King Faisal had already been preparing for such a summit since 1965; where 
he met with many Islamic rulers such as the King of Morocco and persuaded them to 
create of a Muslim convention.167 The first summit was held in Rabat in 1969, followed 
by 1970 summit in Jeddah where twenty three foreign ministers agreed to establish the 
General Secretariat of the Muslim League. The organization’s objective were pan-Islamic 
and called for the solidarity of Muslims to protect them, as article II of the Charter stated: 
“1. To promote Islamic solidarity among member states; 2. To consolidate cooperation 
among member states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other fields of 
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activities…5. To co-ordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support the 
struggle of the people of Palestine…6. To strengthen the struggle of all Muslim peoples 
with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights…”168 
The OIC played an important role in supporting the Palestinian cause. For instance, it 
created a fund in 1972 for the ‘holy war against Israel’.169 In addition, it also worked for 
the Afghan independence from the Soviet Union, assisted Muslim minorities and 
encouraged them to organize and to be better aware of their religion. The OIC also played 
a role in arming Afghan and Bosnian resistance and gave pan-Islamism a military 
dimension.170 
Conclusion 
It is quite difficult to claim that Faisal’s pan-Islam ideology was more appealing to the 
Arab people than Nasser’s pan-Arab ideology. It can be argued that it wasn’t pan-
Islamism that weakened pan-Arab ideology; rather external factors such as the Arab 
forces defeat in the six day war and the death of Nasser contributed to the fading of the 
pan-Arab ideology in the Arab world. In addition, Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 
1979 made Sadat and Egypt widely unpopular in the Middle East and as a result Egypt 
was expelled from the Arab League and the Organization for Islamic Conference. 
However, Egypt’s decline had led to the rise of Saudi Arabia pan-Islamist ideology that 
had spread throughout the world. King Faisal’s popularity in the Islamic world was 
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unprecedented by any previous Saud monarch and he became a symbol of Islamic 
politics. King Faisal’s used a pan-Islam rhetoric in dealing with the Palestinian cause and 
had sent Saudi funds to arm the Palestinian resistance.171 Furthermore, the oil embargo 
that was placed by Saudi Arabia on Israel’s allies for their assistance in 6th October/Yom 
Kippur war in 1973 had also helped Faisal gain a lot of admirers in the Arab World.172 
III. Saudi Arabia and the formation of Jihadist Movements:  
The 1980’s witnessed a new development for Saudi pan-Islamism with the appearance of 
jihadist movements. The jihadist movements began to rise in many armed conflicts in  
Muslim countries such as those in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia and 
Tajikistan in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In order to understand the development of jihadist 
movements; it is necessary to analyze the impact of Sayyid Qutb’s ideology on jihad 
movements and the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the creation of the jihad  movements. 
 As previously mentioned, the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in Saudi Arabia and 
participation in the MWL had an effect in altering the Wahhabi ideology by expanding its 
influence beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia. Yet, Qutb’s work had inspired many 
followers of Wahhabism and paved the road to the creation of fundamental Wahhabi 
movements. Although, it must be noted that  Qutb’s views is not shared by all members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood; as some members of the Muslim Brotherhood disagree with 
Qutb’s literature. It has been also noted that “ The younger generation of Brothers are 
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more eager to engage in the Brotherhood in the political process and play by democratic 
rules…They regard Qutb as problematic, as something of an embarrassment”173 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was one  of the leading figure heads in the Muslim 
Brotherhood  during the 1950’s until his execution in 1966. Qutb was not a religious 
scholar; he received both traditional Islamic education and western education that he had 
received in Egypt, Britain and the United States. Qutb’s experience in the United States 
had left him fearful of the implementation of the vices of the American, namely 
secularism and materialism, in Egypt. According to De Long, Qutb believed that both 
secularism and materialism were the reasons behind the oppression, racism and lack of 
morality in the American society. Therefore, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
late 1940’s.  With Nasser’s rise to power, Qutb was imprisoned and then executed in 
1966. Qutb’s imprisonment and torture in Egyptian prison had led to his radicalization 
and this could be reflected in his most famous political work “milestones” that was 
published in 1964.174 
De Long gives a good comparative analysis between the political thoughts of Sayyid 
Qutb and Ibn Abdel Wahhab in terms of religion and the state and jihad. Both Qutb and 
Ibn Abdel Wahhab call for the return to the direct interpretation of Qur’an and hadith and 
share the same view of Ibn Taymiya’s interpretation of Islam. 175 
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However, both have different perspectives and view about jihad. Qutb views that jihad is 
necessary against non-Muslims and Arab secular ideologies such as pan-Arabism. Qutb’s 
interpretation of the Qur’anic verses was literal interpretation and hence he desired to 
prove that while jihad had been limited during prophet Muhammed’s life; it was a 
necessity or a modus operandi for Islam after his death. In addition, Qutb didn’t believe 
that preaching would have a strong impact on changing society to follow true Islam and 
believed that armed struggle is the most effective method to let people accept the 
message of Islam. On the other hand, Ibn Abdel Wahhab believed that Islam should 
spread through education and awareness rather than using violence. Ibn Abdel Wahhab’s 
interpretation of the Qur’anic verses and hadith were conceptual and therefore he limited 
jihad only in the case of ‘self-defense’ and opposed using jihad as a method for Islamic 
expansion.176 
 Therefore, in summary, Ibn Abdel Wahhab viewed the role of the state to be the 
protection and implementation of shari’a Law and stress on the adherence to 
monotheism. In addition, Abdel Wahhab didn’t have any sentiments against Christians or 
Jews as they were considered people of the book and preached following the prophet’s 
example of engaging in commerce with them. On contrary, Qutb believed that the state 
must enforce the Islamic belief while he had negative views on Christians and Jews as he 
believed they wanted to annihilate Islam.177  
The development of the jihad  movement in Afghanistan clearly illustrated the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s influence in the creation of the movement. In 1979, Soviet troops had 
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invaded Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia’s support for Afghanistan started only as 
humanitarian and political in the early 1980’s but it would soon develop into sending and 
arming the Afghan mujahedeen with the assistance of the United States. According to 
Hegghammer, the quest for jihad in Afghanistan started  in 1981 by the Muslim 
Brotherhood Supreme Guide Kamal al-Sananiri, the brother in law of Sayyid Qutb, as he 
visited Pakistan to assess the state of Afghanistan.  Al- Sananiri managed to convince 
another Jordanian-Palestinian Brotherhood member Abdallah Azzam to join the fight 
against the Soviet Union. While al-Sananiri was killed in Egypt, Azzam had travelled to 
Pakistan and Saudi’s first involvement in Afghanistan came through the Muslim World 
League and the MB.178 
At the beginning of the war, from 1981-1984, only a few fighters had travelled from the 
Arab World ; most of those that went to Pakistan were aid worker s and administrators 
for the Saudi Red Crescent and the Saudi Relief Committee.  Yet, Azzam was able to 
mobilize many Arab and Saudi volunteers through publications such as the karamat 
(articles that presented stories of miracles that occurs to martyrs) , the issuance of fatwas  
on jihad in Afghanistan and the foundation of the Service Bureau which was an 
establishment that managed to arrange mobilization, get funds from  and accommodate 
volunteers. By 1989, it was reported that 12,000-20,000 Saudi volunteers had joined the 
Afghani jihadist movement. 
The Saudi government had largely contributed in the development of jihadist movements 
financially, politically and ideologically.  From 1987-1989, Saudi Arabia had funded the 
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Afghan mujahdeen  with at least US$1.8 billion; a financial support far greater than the 
aid the Palestinian received from 1978-1991 (US$ 992 million) The Saudi government 
encouraged Saudi Arabians through non-governmental organization such as the Muslim 
World League, the use of government controlled media to broadcast messages from 
Afghan mujahdeen and publish fatwas on the participation in jihad in Afghanistan and 
even provided 75% discount on airline flights to Peshwar in Pakistan. 179 
However, Hegghammer points out that the contrary to the common misconception of 
Wahhabi ulamas’ support for jihad in Afghanistan; the ulama didn’t actively promote 
jihad in Afghanistan as most ulama adopted a vague position. This could be illustrated by 
examining Ibn Baz’s fatwa on Afghanistan, where he stated “helping and aiding our 
fighting and exiled Afghan brothers is an individual duty on Muslims today, financially 
and physically or on of the two according to one’s capability”180 The fatwa doesn’t 
explicitly declare jihad nor does it commit all Muslims to participate in Afghan war. 
Thus, this also illustrates the difference between the traditional Wahhabi movement that 
followed Ibn Abdel Wahhab’s teaching on jihad and the neo-Wahhabi jihadist movement 
that were influenced by the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood  Sayyid Qutb. 
The establishment of the jihad  movement proved in its early years to be a success for 
Saudi Arabia as it gave the regime a legitimate boost inside and outside the Kingdom. It 
also managed to raise pan-Islamist unity;  as Nasir al Bahri, former body guard of Osama 
Bin Laden, narrates the reasons behind join the jihad movement 
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“Our basic motive in jihad was to defend Muslim lands. We were greatly affected by the 
tradgies we were witnessing and the events we were seeing: children crying, women 
widowed and high number of incident rape…Otherwise, what would make me leave 
Saudi-Arabia-am I am of Yemeni origin- to go and fight in Bosnia? The issue of 
nationalism was put out of our minds, and we acquired a wider view than that, namely the 
issue of the umma. The issue was very simple at the start, yet it was a motive and an 
incentive for jihad”181 
However, the Saudi government never foresaw that the development of fundamentalist 
jihadist movements would later haunt them . The jihadist movements in Afghanistan had 
been influenced by more radical ideas during their stay in Peshwar and thus global jihad 
movements, that adopted a revolutionary Wahhabi discourse, began to rise. Such 
movement, such as Al-Qaieda, became hostile to Saudi Arabia and was responsible for a 
number of terrorist bombings in the Kingdom itself. Furthermore, the 9/11 terrorist attack 
had tarnished Saudis’ reputation as a leader of pan-Islamism and were accused of 
sponsoring terrorism;  as Clinton’s leaked a memo stating” Saudi donors constituted “the 
most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide”182 
IV. The Challenge of Pan-Islamism for Saudi Arabia: Global Jihad  
Global Jihad movements began to appear in the 1990’s as a result of the growing 
discontent of some Islamists with the failure to Islamize some secular states such as 
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Egypt and Algeria, and the failure to pressure their own states  to oust US military 
presence. In addition, the rise of other pan-Islamist causes, the Saudi crackdown on 
Sahwi intellectuals and jihadist and torturing them in prison contributed in giving such 
global jihad movements popularity in the Islamic World. Therefore, jihadist scholars 
thought that they have exhausted all non-violent methods of resistance and that global 
jihad should be tested.183 
One of the most extreme jihad movements was Al Qaeida; which was founded by Osama 
Bin Laden. Initially, Al Qaeda didn’t have a clear strategy but soon Osama developed 
two core elements by advocating the use of armed struggle against America and its allies, 
and and opting for the use of means of violence to protect the Islamic Umma from non-
Muslim aggression.184 
Al Qaeida founded support within Saudi Arabia through the rise of a new Wahhabi al-
Shu’aybi school. The al-Shu’aybi school, as Hegghammer mentioned, wasn’t a radical 
movement but a strict Wahhabi movement. The al -Shu’aybi filled in a theological gap 
that was left by the death of three top Wahhabi scholars: Ibn Baz. Nasir Al Din Al Albani 
and Muhammed bin Uthaymin. 185  
The writings of the al-Shu’aybi school contributed to the recruitment of jihadists from 
Saudi Arabia through their Wahhabi religious legitimacy. In addition, the al-Shu’aybi 
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assisted in fundraising for al-Qaeida through charitable organization; a tactic that was 
similarly used  by the Saudi Arabian government to fund  the Afghan mujahdeen. 
The 9/11 terrorist attack led Saudi Arabia to revise its own pan-Islamist ideology and 
pursue stricter counter-terrorist measures, as the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in the United 
States explained “Saudi Arabia has questioned more than 1,500 individuals, arrested 
hundreds of suspects, and succeeded in extraditing Al-Qaeda members from other 
countries to face justice. The Kingdom has audited its charities and enacted strict 
financial control measures to ensure that evildoers cannot take advantage of the 
generosity of our citizens. Bank accounts of suspected individuals have been frozen and 
some of the most stringent banking regulations implemented. Saudi Arabia today has 
some of the toughest counter-terrorism laws and regulations in the world.” 186  
v. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the success of Saudi Arabia in using its Wahhabi ideology to 
protect itself from other threatening ideologies and more importantly become a regional 
power in the Middle East. The Saudis were able to achieve this through the establishment 
of non-governmental organization such as the Muslim World League and other grass root 
organizations in different Islamic countries. 
However, as illustrated throughout this chapter, the ideological merge of Wahhabism 
with the radical Brotherhood teachings  and other radical Islamic movements had affected 
greatly Saudi’s foreign policy and pan-Islamist ideology. While traditional Wahhabism 
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remained dominant internally within the Saudi state; yet the Saudi-funded movements 
outside the Kingdom became more radical. Consequently, Saudi Arabia contributed in no 
small measure to the rise of global jihad and became the center of its intellectual 
history.187 However, Saudi Arabia didn’t account for the setbacks of its pan-Islamist 
ideology and did not predict the damages that such an ideology could have on the 
Kingdom and the Islamic World. 
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Chapter V 
Religion and Iranian Foreign Policy 
   
I. Introduction: Brief of Iran’s Foreign Policy  
This chapter aims is to show the impact of religion on Iran’s foreign policy after the 
1979 Iranian revolution. Iran was able to spread its influence through transnational 
Shiite movements and its impact in the Middle East. 
The Iranian Islamic government, inspired by its own revolution, had the desire to export 
its revolutionary ideology throughout the Islamic World. As mentioned before in 
Chapter 3, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the unity of the Islamic Umma regardless of 
the different sects that exist within Islam. Therefore, the Iranian Islamic government had 
pursued a different policy from that of the Safavid state. The Safavids were not keen on 
exporting Shiism ; as they were more concerned with protecting the new Safavid state 
from Sunni Ottomans while the Shiite ulama focused on literature on just ruler and had 
little interest in expanding Shiism.188 
According to Suzanne Maloney, former U.S State Department policy advisor, Khomeini 
believed that exporting their revolution would be more effective if they were to use grass 
root societal and societal networks, as well as “through the dissemination of its precepts 
and the advocacy of its officials, citizenry and broader network of clergy”189  
 
188 Menashri, David. The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 
189 Maloney, Suzanne. Iran's Long Reach: Iran as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008. 
 
100 
 
Therefore, the Iranians had in the beginning resorted to the use of athletes, pilgrims, 
diplomats and officials to promote Iran’s own image as protector of the Islamic World. 
In addition, Iranian officials appealed to the masses by using anti-imperialist rhetoric 
and constantly  showed commitment to the Palestine cause. They also expressed support 
for Shiite minority groups in the Arab and Muslim World. 190 
The Iranians under Khomeini faced two obstacles when they opted for exporting their 
revolution towards other Arab and Muslim states. According to Oliver Roy, the first 
obstacle was the existence of a Sunni-Shiite divide. A series of repressive measures 
against Shi’as were carried out in neighboring states such as in Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan when Saddam in Iraq and the Wahhabi movements in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan perceived a threat to themselves by a possible Shiite uprising. In addition, 
Saudi ulama issued fatwas that declared Shiites as rafida (abandoners) ; a term that is 
now popularly used by Salafis in reference to the Shi’a. The second obstacle was the 
disagreement within the Shi’i Twelver sect on Wilayet al-faqih ; some traditional 
scholars such as those in Iraq disapproved of Khomeini’s doctrine. Yet, Iran chose only 
to assist Shiite movements that adhered to the Iranian government.191 
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini had an impact on changing the Iranian revolutionary 
approach. Former President Rafsanjani and later Khatami focused more on building 
 
190 Mervin, Sabrina. The Shiʻa Worlds and Iran. London: Saqi ;, 2010.29-45 
191 Ibid 
 
101 
 
Shiite movements rather than exporting the revolution itself. Therefore, this approach 
unified the Shiite movements and gave Iran more influence in the Muslim World.192 
Iran’s contribution in the revival of Shiism and the building of Shiite movements in 
post-Soviet Azerbaijan is an example of Iran’s constructing Shiism policy. 60% of Azeri 
are Twelver Shiites. Azerbaijan was part of the Persian Empire yet it became part of the 
Russian Empire under Soviet rule until 1991. The Soviets banned the practice religion in 
the public sphere while they did   placed no restrictions when practiced privately. The 
fall of the Soviet Union had produced an environment that was more favorable for 
religion and religion was practiced in the public sphere once again. As a result, a 
massive number of Azeri students travelled to Iran for theological studies and were 
concentrated on the schools of Khomeini and Hojjatiyeh. The students later became the 
main distributors of Iranian Shiite literature in Azerbaijan. Iran also sent Iranian 
missionaries to Azerbaijan; where they benefited from the weakness of the Azeri state 
and the rising demands of religious education,  Furthermore, the Iranian embassy set up 
cultural centers and charitable foundations such as Imam Khomeini Aid Committee. 
Iranian influence was so tremendous that a political party, Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, 
advertised its adherence to Khomeini’s doctrines. However, Iran’s success was limited 
due to the fact that Azeri were mostly secularized and Turkish Sunni movements that 
competed for influence in Azerbaijan.193 
The election of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shifted Iran’s foreign policy 
once again to become more revolutionary. Ahmadinejad’s rise to power came mainly 
 
192 Ibid 
193 Ibid167-193 
  
102 
 
from the support of religious clerics. his supporters were from religious communities. 
According to Haynes, Khatami claims that Ahmadinejad had received his support from 
the Hojjatiyeh Society, an ultraconservative Shia group that are anti-Baha’i and anti-
Sunni) , Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the mentor of Ahmadinejad, and members of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard.194 Accordingly, supporters of Ahmadinejad can be 
classified as revolutionary; they believe that the revolution shouldn’t be subjected to 
reforms. In terms of foreign policy, they are strongly anti-Western and therefore hold 
sentiments against the US. In addition, the Hojjatiyeh Society, which its claimed that 
Ahmadinejad is a member of this group, emphasis on a connection between the group 
and the Mahdi; which is contrary to the belief of other rightist movements that view the 
Supreme Leader as the intermediary between the Mahdi and the people.195  
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy was largely influenced by the revolutionary ideology of his 
supporters. While before Ahmadinejad’s presidency, former governments had only been 
supportive of fundamentalist anti-regime groups in states; under President Ahmadinejad 
Iran became politically more involved in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and 
Yemen. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s anti-Western rhetoric that was used multiple times 
showed his adherence to the Hojjatieh and other ultraconservative right movements. For 
example, Ahmadinejad accused the West of conspiring against  Iran through planning a 
drought, as he states: 
“Today our country is moving towards drought, which is partly unintentional due to 
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industry and partly intentional, as a result of the enemy [the West] destroying the clouds 
moving towards our country and this is a war that Iran is going to overcome.”196 
In another speech, Ahmadinejad accuses the United States of bullying other countries, 
while addressing the General Assembly; he said “'Now even elementary school kids 
throughout the world have understood that the United States government is following an 
international policy of bullying”197 
Lastly, Ahmadinejad referred to the Mahdi a several times in his speech domestically and 
internationally; which again shows the similarity between Ahmadinejad and the 
Hojjatiyeh Society. His speech at the UN General Assembly in 2012 clearly illustrates 
this, as he stated: 
 “Now we can see and sense the sweet scent and the soulful breeze of the spring, a spring 
that has just begun and doesn’t belong to a specific race, ethnicity, nation or a region, a 
spring that will soon reach all the territories in Asia, Europe, Africa and America....The 
arrival of the ultimate savior [a term Shi’ites use for the Mahdi] will mark a new 
beginning, a rebirth and a resurrection. It will be the beginning of peace, lasting security 
and genuine life,” 
Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, had been trying to improve relations with 
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countries that former President Ahmadinejad had been hostile to, such as Saudi Arabia 
and the West. Rouhani enjoyed the backing of reformists in Iran and promised to ease 
sanctions imposed by the US and its allies. He pledged to introduce  liberal reforms and 
lift some political restrictions.198 Rouhani currently shows experience and maturity in 
foreign policy in handling Iran’s nuclear program until his resignation. Referred to as the 
“diplomat sheik”, Rouhani managed to reach agreement in the P5+1 meeting in Geneva 
to access $4.2 billion in funds frozen as part of the financial sanctions while Iran 
promised to expand its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency .199   
Looking at Iran’s foreign policy; it appears that Iran becomes more radical when it is 
controlled by conservative elements. Under Khomeini and Ahmadinejad, Iran’s role in 
the Middle East greatly increased while maintaining an anti-Western rhetoric. However, 
under Rafsanjani, Khatami and currently under Rouhani; Iran takes a more pragmatic 
stance while trying to move close to the West and quietly operates in building transitional 
networks. 
The next section will discuss Iran’s role in the creation of Hizbollah in Lebanon and 
Shi’a transnational networks in Gulf States. Furthermore, it will discuss the influence or 
impact both of movements on their state and how it affected Iran’s image as a Pan-
Islamist leader. 
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II. The formation of Hizbollah: 
The most successful and most influential group that was created and supported by Iran is 
Lebanon’s Hizbollah. Hizbollah, meaning the Party of God in Arabic, is a Shiite 
movement that was founded roughly between 1982 and 1985. The group started out as a 
small militia group that was formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during 
the Lebanese Civil War.200 However, it is now possibly the most powerful political group 
in Lebanon and enjoys a lot of popular support in the Arab and Islamic World. Hizbollah 
has played an important role in resisting the Israeli occupation in Lebanon. In addition, It 
is currently playing a crucial role in the protection of Bashar Al Assad’s regime in the 
Syrian Civil War. 
Hizbollah is among the earliest Shiite groups that were prompted by the Iranian 
Revolution; as Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement inspired their clerics. According to 
Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary General of Hizbollah, the ideology of the party 
originated from the ideas of three different Shiite clerics: 
a. Imam Musa al Sadr ,founder of the Shiite Amal Movement and the Supreme 
Islamic Shia Council in Lebanon,  
b. Ayatollah Mohamed Mahdi Shamseldin, former head of the Supreme Islamic Shia 
Council and founder of the Islamic University in Lebanon, 
c. Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, an influential Shiite marja  
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Qassem notes that Fadallah was a supporter of the Iranian revolution and had it partly 
played a role in the creation of ideological concept of the party, as he wrote in his book  
“He[Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah] was a symbol of many ideological 
concepts within the party, guiding Hizbollah through a mature vision of Islam and of the 
Islamic movement, supporting the Islamic revolution’s leader in Iran, Ayatullah 
Khomeini”201  
Therefore, according to Joseph Alagha, ,  the three constituent elements of Hizbollah 
ideology were adherence to Shiism, Wilayet al Faqih and jihad.202 Hussein Al Musawi, 
a prominent member of Hizbollah, said that the religious ideology of the party dictated 
that they should establish an Islamic order based on Wilayet al Faqih.203  The early 
leadership of Hizbollah, represented by Subhi al-Tufayli, its first Secretary General of 
Hizbollah, had believed that they should form a second Islamic State in Lebanon, as al-
Tufayli declared: 
 “We [Hizbullah] consider the regime of Amin Jumayyel [the Lebanese president at the 
time] as one created by the Western imperialism to destroy the personality of Muslims in 
this country and to Westernise it. And we will not allow that…We should first defend 
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the Islamic Revolution and Iran before considering the formation of a second Islamic 
state in Lebanon”204 
The Iranian-Israeli relationship had taken a turning point after the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran. In order to show Iran’s solidarity with the Palestinian cause; the Islamic Iranian 
government cancelled all trade agreements with Israel and until today did not recognize 
the state of Israel; often referring to it as the Zionist Regime in the international arena. 
205 Ayatollah Khomeini previously described Israel as the “Little Satan”206 and believes 
that “Israel should be whipped off the map”207The Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, a 
region which demographically had a Shi’ite majority, led to Iran’s intervention to 
protect the Shiite population in South Lebanon.  
The Shiites presence in Lebanon can be traced back to the ninth century ; in an area 
known as Jabal Amil in the South of Lebanon and the north of Biqa’ Valley in the North 
east of Lebanon. The Shiites were an oppressed minority under the rule of the Mamlukes 
and Ottomans; however, they maintained a high status under Safavid rule. According to 
Alagha, the Shiites were once again marginalized and deprived in the new Lebanese 
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state; as the Sunnis and Maronites held more power. Al Agha describes the living 
conditions of the Shiites post-1932 census of Lebanon; 
“During that time the unjust economic distribution was clearly evident: famine, 
illiteracy, and deprivation characterized the rural peripheral regions inhabited mostly by 
the Shi‘ites, while Beirut was shining with an impressive apparent prosperity. Thus, 
Beirut blossomed and became a showplace of wealth and consumption, while the Shi‘ite 
slums became more crowded and expanded”208 
The living conditions of the Shiites in Lebanon got worse with the increasing Israeli 
aggression against Lebanon in the late 1960’s and 1970’s as a result of Lebanese support 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The aggression and the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict that took part in the South of Lebanon had led to many Shiites in 
Lebanon relocating from their homes in the South and inflicted heavy economic losses 
on them. Furthermore, to make matters worse, the out-break of the Lebanese Civil War 
in 1976 witnessed the Maronites ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign in Beirut which led the 
Shiites to move from East to the South of Beirut.  
Imam Musa Al Sadr managed to organize and unite the Shiites of Lebanon and armed 
Amal Movement in order to protect the Shiites in Lebanon from the damages of the civil 
war and the Israeli aggression. In addition, Amal assisted the PLO against Israeli 
hostilities. However, Al Sadr disappeared in 1978 on a trip to Libya and clashes erupted 
between the PLO and Amal Movement. The relationship between the PLO and the 
 
208 Alagha, Joseph Elie. The Shifts in Hizbullahs Ideology Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and 
Political Program .24 
 
109 
 
Shiites grew so bitter that the Israeli Defense Forces were showered with handful of rice 
upon the invasion of South Lebanon.209  
Iran had noticed the power vacuum in the Lebanese state as the result of the Civil War 
and Israeli invasion. From 1982 onward, Iran provided ideological, financial and 
military assistance for Hizbollah. Khomeini sent 1500 Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards- Al Quds force) to Lebanon in order to train the Hizbollah militia-men. 
Therefore, Hizbollah would not have succeeded had it not been for Iranian support. 210 
 Hizbollah’s military successes in the resistance of the Israeli occupation; forcing 
the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 and later the prevention of another Israeli 
invasion in 2006; gave Iran more popularity in the Islamic world and a foothold with 
other Sunni movements . Consequently, Iran offered Hamas $50 million in assistance 
and provided long term training assistance to Hamas’s militia.211 
Iran’s image as a defender of Islam was greatly strengthened after Hamas was able to 
resist the Israeli military aggression against Gaza in 2006,2008,2012 and 2014. Iran’s 
popularity in Palestine greatly increased; as in 2012 billboards were put across Gaza 
thanking Iran for arming Hamas.212 
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Hizbollah involvement in Lebanese politics has however shifted the party’s ideology to 
grow less dependent on Iran and more independent on itself. As Alagha explained, the 
party’s involvement in Lebanese politics had forced the party to shift from its Islamic 
state ideology that it once wanted to adopt to accepting the secular nation of the Lebanese 
state. This is partly because the party knew that promoting the Islamic state ideology 
would isolate the group politically while hindering its popularity internally; especially 
with other sects.213   
However, it remains doubtful that Hizbollah have truly become independent of Iranian 
influence. Hizbollah’s current involvement in the Syrian Civil War and the facilitating 
the passage of Iranian Revolutionary Guards to pass through Lebanon214 to fight in Syria 
does show that Iran’s influence has not decreased. However, it could be that both 
Hizbollah and Iran share the same concern about the rise of extremist Sunni movements 
such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusra Movement and 
its effect on Alawites and the Shiite population in Lebanon and Iraq. Furthermore, Syria’s 
President, Bashar Al Assaad has been a close ally of both Hizbollah and Iran Hizbollah’s 
rise had undoubtedly boosted Iranian influence in the Arab World. 
III. Iran and the Shiite Transnational Networks in the Gulf; Bahrain 
Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 certainly ignited a spark of political unrest in both the 
states of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Demonstrations erupted only a few months after the 
Iranian revolution and had threatened the legitimacy of both Al Saud and Al Khalifa 
governments; particularly the Islamic Front for Liberation (IFL) was close to stage a coup 
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against the Al Khalifa monarchy. Iran’s support to Shiite movements in Bahrain and 
Saudi was not as a great as its support to Hizbollah. Yet, its revolutionary ideology had a 
great impact in stirring up events in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  
The Bahraini and Saudi Shiites are ‘original inhabitants’ of their region; as modern 
Bahrain and the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia used to be a part of the ancient 
Kingdom of Bahrain (under the Carnathians) According to Laurence Louër, the Bahranis 
were among the earliest supporters of Shiism in Arabia. However, after a series of 
conquests in the region; in 1783 Al Khalifa conquered Bahrain while in 1913 Abdel Aziz 
Al Saud managed to recapture the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. 215 
In Bahrain, growing opposition began to rise after the Religious Bloc was disbanded from 
the Parliament by the King in 1976. This led to the rise of the Shiraziyyan, a radical 
Shiite group, headed by Hadi El Mudarrisi. Mudarrisi had close ties with Ayatollah 
Khomeini which led him to travel with a group of his followers to receive military 
training with the PLO. Later, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Mudarrisi 
declared that he was the representative of Ayatollah Khomeini in Bahrain. In 1980, 
demonstrations broke out in protest to the arrest of Sheikh Mohamed al Akri, a politically 
active Shiite scholar in Bahrain. The demonstrations were quelled and Mudarrisi was 
deported and stripped of his Bahraini citizenship. Yet, this didn’t stop Bahraini activist 
from continuing with their struggle against Al Khalifa as they witnessed a much bigger 
demonstration in April 1980; the demonstration was violently dispersed leading to the 
death of several demonstrators. 
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The Shiraziyyin movement, a movement that was developed in Iraq by Ayatollah 
Mohammed al-Shirazi ,under Mudarrisi  proved to be useful to Iranians domestically and 
internationally. As most of the Shiraziyyin members were deported to Iran; many of its 
members promoted the Iranian revolution in Arab regions within Iran and outside Iran. 
Many Shiraziyyin members were employed as vigilantes in Khuzistan, an Arab province 
in Iran. Furthermore, the Shiraziyyin helped in setting up the first PLO embassy in 
Tehran. In addition, they also assisted in establishing the Office of Liberation 
Movements; its task was to coordinate and support or sponsor armed liberation 
movements against “oppressive rulers”216 
According to Louër, the Shiraziyyan were ideologically close to the Iranian government 
and assisted heavily in trying to export Iran’s revolution in the Arab world, as Louër 
explains the close relationship between Iran and the Shiraziyyin: 
“For the Shiraziyyin, Iran was not only a back base for political activities targeting their 
respective home countries, it was a country where they had the unique opportunity to put 
in practice their conception of the ideal Islamic Society.”217 
IV. Conclusion 
Iran’s success can be mainly attributed to the oppressed state that Shi’as had been living 
in under some Sunni regimes such as in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Iran mainly used its 
Shiite identity to appeal to Shiites in the Arab and Muslim World and had gained a lot of 
acceptance of its message of its revolutionary message. However, Iran continues to face 
challenge of the Sunni-Shiite divide which undermines its capabilities of becoming the 
leader of the pan-Islamist movement. Despite its Shiite identity, Iran illustrated often its 
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willingness to support Sunni movements such as Hamas whenever the situation 
permitted. 
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Chapter VI 
The Iranian-Saudi Strife and the Outbreak of Division in the Middle East 
I. Introduction 
The last three decades witnessed the development of political Islamist movements in the 
Muslim World. From the rise of moderate Islamist parties, such as the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkey and the Nahda in Tunisia, to the rise of extremist 
parties, such as Al Qaeda and ISIL ; they have all played a role in changing the identity 
and the political landscape of the Muslim World. 
Political Islam was able to fill in the ideological vacuum that was left by secular ideas; 
as Arab, Persian and even Turkish nationalists had failed in achieving their objectives 
while the fall of the Soviet Union had ended Communism. Another important factor for 
the development of political Islam was the increasing support from Saudi Arabia and 
Iran to some Islamist movements; as they managed to create powerful movements such 
as the Afghan mujahdeen and Hizbollah.  
The Islamists movements mainly enjoy support in the Muslim World for two main 
reasons; ideology and the provision of social services. In terms of ideology, according to 
Shadi Hamid, the PEW Survey on Religion and Public Life illustrated that large majority 
of Muslims in the Middle East take shari’a law very seriously.218 In addition, the same 
survey showed that most  Muslims that participated in the survey in the Middle East 
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practiced their rites of their own religion. Lastly, most of those that were surveyed in the 
Muslim World believed that it was necessary to believe in God in order to be morally 
good. 219  
Islamists rely on their social networks in order to be able to present social services to 
their community. This usually gives Islamist movements an edge over other secular 
movements. The Islamist Nusra front, for example, has been able to recruit more 
followers than the secular Syrian Free Army; as Murhaf Jouejati, a Syrian activist, 
commented on al Nusra’s popularity "They continue to increase in popularity, 
particularly as they begin to implement social services." 
i. The Iranian Revolution and the Beginning of the Cold War: 
As previously mentioned in the first Chapter, Khomeini’s Iranian Revolution had a direct 
influence on the Shiite population in the Gulf; hence the Shiites in the region ,with 
limited Iranian assistance, managed to organize several political and social disturbances 
and instability in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  This prompted Saudi Arabia to 
increase its funding in countering the Iranian threat; most notably sponsoring Saddam 
Hussein’s war against Iran. In addition, according to Vali Nasser, Saudi Arabia wanted to 
hold Iran’s advances in the region and therefore had contributed to spreading radical 
Sunni movements in Central Asia in an effort to contain Iran.220 In the 1980’s, several 
Sunni radical groups in Pakistan that were explicitly anti-Shiite, such as Sepah e 
Saheban, caused the rise of sectarian violence in 1985 between Sunnis and Shi’as. In 
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Afghanistan, the Taliban’s capture of Kabul resulted in the massacre of Shiites in the 
city.221  
To summarize, Eyup Ersoy, a Turkish political analyst, gives his incite about the rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia; “The metaphysics of rivalry is as important as the physics 
of rivalry, and the most important variable determining the metaphysics of rivalry is the 
self-identifications of the parties. While the prevailing form of self-identification in Iran 
stresses that Iran is a non-Sunni and non-Arab country, one of the ‘others’ of Salafism as 
the prevailing worldview in Saudi Arabia is Shiism. This situation gives both sides the 
means to mobilize material and non-material resources more, to provide legitimacy more 
easily for their policies, to make the basis of their support more widespread, and to 
broaden the sphere of their policies. In particular, for Iran, Shi’a politics is an 
indispensible part of its struggle for regional influence and its rivalry with Saudi 
Arabia.”222 
In the past few years, the Middle East witnessed several phenomenon which came to be 
known as the Arab Spring. Such movements occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Some movements succeeded in removing their 
authoritarian regimes, such as the revolutions that occurred in both Tunisia and Egypt. In 
Jordan, the King has taken several measures to reform the state after the eruption of mass 
demonstrations.223 In Bahrain, the government suppressed mass demonstrations that took 
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place in Pearl Square224 Lastly, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen have all witnessed bloody 
conflicts between different factions with the support of foreign countries; distinctly Iran 
and Saudi-Arabia. Whereas the main objective of the Arab Spring was democracy, 
freedom and social justice; the Arab Spring took a sectarian course in Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen. 
The Arab Spring has also resulted in the further development of Islamist movements; as 
more Islamist movements emerged to power in their own states. Consequently, in Tunisia 
Al Nahda Party, an Islamist political movement, became until recently dominant party in 
parliament.225 In Egypt, Mohamed Morsy, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, won 
the presidential election in 2012.226 However, such victories were short lived as Al Nahda 
Party lost their parliamentary dominance to the secular Nidaa Tunis whereas in Egyp that 
Islamists suffered a cruel fate after former President Mohamed Morsi was ousted from 
office by the Egyptian military following a popular uprising.227  
Elsewhere, other jihad movements such as Al Nusra Front and ISIL  appeared on the 
scene in conflict areas especially Syria and Iraq. These movements managed to recruit 
supporters from all around the world; providing military training to its volunteers. 
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Two states, Iraq and Syria, have for the past three years of the Arab Spring been affected 
the by Saudi and Iranian intervention in their domestic politics; causing a Sunni-Shiite 
sectarian war in both regions.  
II. War in Iraq: 
i. Brief History of Iraq and Ethnic Diversity: 
The Republic of Iraq is one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse states in the 
Middle East. Consequently, Iraq has many different religious, ethnic and political 
ideologies. However,  Iraq can be divided into three main factions: Sunni Arabs, Shiite 
Arabs and Sunni Kurds. According to Robert Siegel, , it is estimated that the Sunni Arabs 
compose of 17% percent of the population, Kurds (mostly Sunni) compose of 20% of the 
population and Shia Arabs compose 60% of the population.228 
Iraq, earlier known as Mesopotamia, was one of the earliest civilizations in the world. 
Iraq had come under Arab control in 636 AD and it was later ruled by the Ummayads. 
The city of Karbala in Iraq witnessed the battle between Yazid Ibn Muwayyi’a and Al 
Hussein; a decisive battle that divided both Sunnis and Shi’as. The Ummayads were 
overthrown by the Abbasids and the second Abbasid Caliph Abu Jaafar Al Mansour built 
the city of Baghdad; making it the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate. In the 16th century, 
Iraq was divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids; yet the Ottomans managed to 
defeat the Safavids and divided Iraq into three provinces; Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. 
The Ottomans ruled until the end of World War I; whereby Iraq became a British 
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mandate and King Faisal I became the ruler of Iraq in 1921.229 The Hashemite Kingdom 
was overthrown by a military coup d’état in 1958 by led by Abd-al-Karim Qasim and 
Abd-al-Salam Muhammad Arif. After a series of coups, in 1979 Saddam Hussein became 
the President of Iraq.230 
ii. Iraqi Shiites and the Iraqi-Iran War 
Saddam Hussien declared war on Iran only a few months after his presidency. He used 
his Ba’athist Arab nationalism ideology in order to win the support of the Arab Shiites 
while oppressing those that opposed his war against Iran. William Drozdiak, gives an 
explanation why Saddam was relatively successful in mobilizing some Arab Shiites in his 
war against Iran, “The apparent reluctance of the Iraqi Shiite majority, who form 55 
percent of the population, to follow the politics of fellow believers in Iran reveals an 
abiding nationalistic distrust of their Persian neighbors and an intense disdain for the 
excesses of Khomeini's harsh fundamentalist rule… the political and military leadership 
in Baghdad have cast the war in terms of a struggle for national survival. As a result, the 
morale of Shiites in the Iraqi front lines has noticeably improved, say foreign military 
sources.”231 
However, Iran was able to establish an alliance with Iraq’s oldest Shi’a Party, Al Daw’a 
Shiite Party, and created the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq(SCIRI) In addition, Iran 
assisted in creating and training the SCIRI’s militant group; Al Badr. The Al Daw’a Party 
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had opposed Saddam’s rule. Both movements took refuge in Iran. In 1991, a Shiite 
uprising in Iraq was severely crushed by Saddam Hussein’s forces; leading to the exile of 
many Iraqi Shiite scholars to Iran.  
iii. The American Invasion, Iran and Shi’ite Dominance of Iraq 
In 2003, the American invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein shifted the 
balance of power from the Sunni to the Shi’ite. The first struggle witnessed in Iraq was 
within the Shi’a sect itself; as the Dawa’a and the SCIRI clashed with the Sadrist 
Movement. The Sadrist wanted to establish an Islamic state and they opposed the 
existence of US troops in Iraq. Whereas the  Dawa’aa and SCIRI wanted to hold 
democratic elections while maintaining the autonomy of the south (Shi’a regions)232 
Oddly enough, Iran supported both parties. According to Ray Takeyh , the Iranians 
thought it would be an opportunity to support a charismatic leader that had influenced 
both the Shiite and Sunni population and an opponent to the American invasion.233 While 
an official Iranian has claimed to have trained 800-1200 of the Mahdi army in Iran’s 
embassy in Iraq.234    
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The United States had accused Iran of playing a double game as Iran trained and 
equipped Mahdi army, the militia group of the Sadrists, while also backing the  Dawa’a 
and the SCIRI in their preparation for elections.235  
After the conflict was slightly resolved between the SCIRI and the Sadrist in 2005; the 
religious Shiite United Iraqi coalition bloc (the political bloc of  Dawa’a and SCIRI) , 
headed by Ibrahim Jaafari, won the elections with 48% vote while the secular Shiite Iraqi 
National List Alliance, headed by Iyad Allawi, had gained 14% vote. The Sunnis Iraqi 
Accordance Front had boycotted the elections in protest to the American occupation of 
Iraq.236 
iv. Sunni Insurgence 2004-2014 
 The rise of Shiite power led to the formation of Iraqi Sunni militant groups. Anthony H. 
Cordesman mentioned that in 2004 Sunni militants were divided into two groups; the old 
regime militants and neo-salafi militants. The old regime militias were secular Sunni that 
were composed of former police commandos and former army officers. While the neo-
Salafi militas in Iraq, such as the Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, held a 
relatively new ideology that was influenced by Saudi Arabia.237 
Hence, a sectarian conflict erupted between both the Shiites and Sunnis. According to 
Cordesman, the neo-Salafi movements were willing to use violence against Shiite non-
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combatants and saw that the Sunni insurgency was a part of a general war for the control 
of Islam; an ideology that was closely similar to traditional Wahhabism.238 
Whereas Saudi government had a limited involvement in the first Sunni insurgency in 
Iraq; yet its estimated that 1500 Saudi jihadist travelled to Iraq in 2003.239 Hegghammer 
notes that it is difficult to measure the impact of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Sunni 
insurgency. Yet, in accordance to Cordesman’s earlier statement, neo-Salafism was a 
foreign idea in Iraq before 2004. Therefore, it is possible that salafist jihadist in Iraq were 
influenced by Saudi jihadist.  
In 2006, a group of 38 scholars from Saudi Arabia and Iraq met in Istanbul and issue of a 
declaration that encouraged anti-occupation and anti-Shiite jihad. Furthermore, Saudi 
scholar al Rahman al Barrak issued a fatwa that regarded Shiism as blasphemous. 
However, Saudi’s Grand Mufti rejected the anti-Shiite fatwas and the Istanbul declaration 
while calling for unity in Iraq and denouncing sectarian violence. Yet, Toby Craig Jones, 
professor of modern Middle East history at Rutgers University, comprehends that despite 
the declaration of the Grand Mufti; Saudis political leaders wanted an escalation of 
sectarianism in Iraq.240 Lastly, Saudi has been involved indirectly in funding Sunni 
Islamists movements in Iraq. While the Saudi government denies any funding to  Iraqi 
Sunni movements; yet  the US-Iraq Study Group reported that the Saudi are a source of 
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funding Sunni insurgent. In addition, an Iraqi official reported that $25 million of Saudi 
money went to a top Iraqi Sunni sheikh for the purchase of weapons.241 
The  Arab Spring intensified the Sunni-Shiite conflict even further in 2012. Since the 
evacuation of US troops; Sunnis have been heavily discriminated against; as they have 
been shut off from key jobs in government and universities while Shi’a banners spread all 
over Baghdad.242 Furthermore, a report written by Al Jazeera asserted that detentions, 
torture, and executions targeted Sunnis under Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq; as a female 
Iraqi accounts her nephew’s story in Iraqi prison “They beat him with metal pipes, used 
harsh curse words and swore against his sect and his Allah (because he is Sunni) and why 
God was not helping him, and that they would bring up the prisoners' mothers and sisters 
to rape them" 243 
 The discrimination and the harsh living conditions that the Sunnis faced in Iraq led to the 
organization of mass demonstrations against Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. 
According to Colin Freeman, the Iraqis participants in the mass demonstration had a 
different motive than those that in other countries of the Arab Spring, as he reports; “The 
participants in Iraq’s version of the Arab Spring have little in common with the cuddly, 
middle-class Facebookers who were the stars of Egypts’ Tahrir Square. Many are tough 
tribal leaders and ex-Ba’athists, the same disenfranchised folk who formed an alliance of 
convenience with al-Qaeda during the US occupation to wage war on both the Americans 
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and Iraq’s Shia community. They have weapons, militias and a decade of guerrilla know-
how, not to mention potential backing from other Sunni states like Saudi Arabia.”244 
 The Iraqi government would pay the price for its discrimination after the Sunni jihadist 
ISIL managed to capture the city of Mosul. According to a CBS new report, the Sunni 
majority residents of Mosul had welcomed the coming of ISIL; even one doctor said that 
they were better than the government.245 A sub-chapter on ISIL will discuss later the 
establishment of the group, its objectives, history and relationship with Wahhabism and 
Saudi Arabia. 
II. War in Syria: 
i. Brief History of Syria and Ethnic Diversity: 
Similar to Iraq; the Arab Republic of Syria has multiple ethnicities and different religious 
sects.  Syria has Arab as well as non-Arab ethnic Sunni groups such as Kurds, Turkmen, 
Circassians, Chechens, Bosnians and Albanians. Whereas in terms of religion, it is 
estimated that 74% of the population are Sunni Muslims, 11% Alawites, 3%  Druze, 1% 
Twelver Shiites while other minorities such as  Ismaili Shi’ites, Zayids and Christians are 
all less than 1% each.246 
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Syria is also another ancient civilization and it is estimated that Damascus, Syria’s 
capital, has been built in 15000 BC. The Arabs took over Syria  from the Byzantine 
Empire in 636 A.D while Damascus had later become the capital of the Umayyad 
Caliphate. Syria came under Ottoman rule in 1516 and would later become a French 
mandate after World War I. It gained independence of French rule in 1946 and after a 
series of political clashes; Hafez Al Assad, a secular Alawite Baathist, became the 
President of Syria in 1970. Since 1970, Syria has been under the rule of the Assad family; 
as Hafez Al Assad was later succeeded by his son Bashar in 2000.247   
ii. Global Jihadists and Syria: 
In 2010, Nibras Kazim  had predicted that Jihadists will one day arrive in Syria causing 
instability in the region; as jihadist view the Syrian regime as the “perfect enemy”. 
According to Kazimi the Jihadist view on the Alawite is similar to that of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
views on Alawties. He saw the Alawites as a threat to the existence of Sunnis. In 
addition, Ibn Taymiyya issued three fatwas regarding the Alawites. First he claimed that 
the Alawites are an infidel heretic group. Second, he claimed that the Alawites couldn’t 
be trusted as they have always allied themselves with the enemy of Islam. Third, Ibn 
Taymiyya asserts that Alawites should be fought.248 
Syria has strategic religious importance for both Sunnis and Shi'as; due to the fact that it 
had witnessed the early struggles between Muwa’yyia and Ali Bin Abi Talib in the early 
years of Islam. In addition, Sunnis believe that the Mahdi will rise to lead the Muslim 
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World from Damascus, whereas the Shiites believe that the Syrians will stand against the 
awaited Mahdi.249 
The rise of Hafez Al Assad to power in 1970 had created a sectarian conflict between the 
Sunni Islamists, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, and the regime. Sunni Islamists had 
resorted to violence after the 1973 constitutional amendments in which the Sunni Islamist 
thought that Assad was using secularism as a cover to promote Alawite dominance. After 
the assassination attempt on Assad in 1980; the Syrian government had launched a 
campaign of suppression against Sunni Islamist movements; which culminated in the 
annihilation of Islamists in Hama in 1982. 
After Hafez Al Assad’s death, a number of factors emerged to pave the way for the return 
of jihadists to Syria. While Hafez al Assaad was cautious not to tamper with the identity 
of the Sunni population; as he probably knew that it would to inflame more riots; Bashar 
Al Assad on the other hand allowed Iran’s campaign of Shi'a proselytizing to proceed in 
Syria. In addition, the rise of Iranian influence in the region increasingly alarmed Sunni 
states such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and other Jihadist movements. 
The first calls for jihad came from Abu Mus'ab al Suri and Abu Baseer al-Tartousi. Al 
Suri  called on Sunnis to become “guardians of the religion of Allah in Greater Syria” and 
protect it from the Alawites and deviating sects. Furthermore, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, 
the founder of ISIL, outlined  that one of the goals of jihad should be the wholesale 
annihilation of Shi'as and Alawites in preparation for fighting the West and Israel.. 250 
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This led to the creation of Syrian jihad movement in May 2007. The Jama'at altawhid 
wel jihad fi bilad alsham,headed by "Abu Jandal", declared jihad against Bashar Assad 
and the Alawaites. Consequently, the first major terrorist attack took place in 27 
September 2008; its intended target was the Seyyida Zeinab Shrine; most sacred Sh'ia 
shrine in Syria. 
In March 2011, uprisings similar to the ones witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia erupted in 
Syrian cities. The uprisings started with demands for the “downfall the regime.” Yet, as 
Bashar Al Assad had used violent oppressive measures to silence the ‘revolutionaries’ ; 
armed militias started to rise into Syria.  This led to an influx of Sunni jihadists and Shiite 
militiamen in Syria. Sawzan Hassan, a Lebanese journalist, provides a detailed summary 
of the events that occurred in Syria since the start of the uprising; “The Arab Spring in 
Syria started out with a dream of democracy, social justice, equal opportunity, and state 
institutions that fight corruption.... A new ideology, which had previously not found 
fertile ground in Syrian society, has entered the country. It is the jihadist and takfirist 
ideology (takfir is the practice of one Muslim declaring another Muslim an unbeliever). 
Making things worse were the violent methods used by the regime to deal with the 
protests from the beginning and the sectarian propaganda from all sides”251 
The Syrian Civil War, unlike the Iraqi insurgence, is not purely a Shiite-Sunni war; as the 
war has grown more complicated with different factions, sometimes with similar 
ideologies, combating each other. The war witnessed combats between Al Nusra Front 
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and FSA252,  ISIL and Al Nusra Front253,ISIL and Kurds 254and between the Syrian army 
with the support of Hizbollah with most of the factions existing in Syria.  
However, the intervention of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in Syria deepened the 
sectarian rift. It caused majority Sunni states, such as Egypt under former President 
Mohamed Morsi, to declare jihad against Bashar’s government and the Shiites. Sheikh 
Mohammed al-Arifi, a leading Saudi cleric, had called for jihad in Syria while preaching 
in Al Azhar mosque in June 2013. 255Furthermore, former President Mohamed Morsi had 
expressed his aid to the rebels in Syria; while some Islamic clerics made anti-Shiite and 
anti-Iranian declarations.256 Whereas Iran and Hizbollah sent troops/militiamen to Syria 
in order to protect the Assad government.257  Hizbollah’s initial reason for intervening in 
Syria, as claimed by Hassan Nasrallah, was to protect the holy shrine of Sayyida Zeinab 
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in Damascus.258 However, in a bizarre move, Hizbollah announced the recruitment of 
non-Shiite volunteers in order to fight ISIL.259 
V. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian born Sunni militant, established Al Qaeda 
movement in Iraq in 2004. Its main objective was to provoke a civil war between the 
newly dominant Shiites against the Sunnis and to fight the US occupation of Iraq. Al 
Qaeda had focused on suicide bombings that targeted Shiites and their sacred sites as 
well as the US occupation forces. The Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had developed broader 
goals in 2007; as they aimed for defeating the United States and creating a Sunni-led 
Islamic State that could expand beyond Iraq’s borders.260 Whereas the US presence in 
Iraq had been successful in containing AQI; the US departure followed by the Syrian 
Civil War had strengthened the organization. 
In 2013, ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), had announced its independence from Al 
Qaeda amid tensions that broke out between the two movements.261 One year later, ISIL 
managed to capture Mosul in Iraq and all cities between Deir Ezzor city in Syria and the 
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Iraq border.262 The Central Intelligence Agency of the USA currently estimates that the 
number of ISIL militiamen ranges from 20,000 to 35,000. 263 
The relationship between ISIL and the Saudi Arabian government remains controversial 
to political analysts and journalists. Currently, there aren’t enough documents or sources 
that could prove or deny Saudi support for ISIL. The Saudi Arabian government denies 
that it has funded and armed ISIL.264 Whereas Iraq’s former Prime Minister, Nour Al 
Maliki, accused Saudi Arabia of funding ISIL. In addition, a Qatari official stated that 
“ISIS has been a Saudi project.” 265 However, its certain that private donors from Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states have funded ISIL because they strongly believe in the need to 
counter the Iranian threat.266 In addition, Saudi volunteers have taken part in the conflict 
with ISIL. However, Saudi Grand Mufti issued a fatwa stating that ISIL are terrorist 
group and that the Saudi people shouldn’t join ISIL.267 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion 
It is largely naïve to assume that identity is the only reason for the creation of the Saudi-
Iranian cold war. There are numerous other important factors that led to the rise of the 
Iranian-Saudi struggle. An example could be that both have different rival allies; Iran is 
supported up by China and Russia while Saudi Arabia is supported up by the USA. 
Another factor could be the oil struggle between both Saudi Arabia and Iran; as both 
countries rank first and second respectively in terms of oil reserves. Additionally, the 
fear of loss of sovereignty over Shiite majority areas of Saudi Arabia or the Sunni or 
Arab majority areas in Iran could threaten the loss of their natural resources and thus 
lead to an political and economic loss. Lastly, it could be an ethnic struggle between 
Arabs and Persians for supremacy in the Middle East. 
However, by using constructivism to analyze the relationship between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran ; the ontology can be used to explain the origins of the conflict between the two 
states and can also clarify how each state was able to use its own ideology to expand its 
foreign interests268. As Wendt mentioned,  the variables of interest to constructivist 
scholars have a certain social meanings. He explains that social meaning is built from a 
specific combination of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs in order to explain state 
behavior.269 Therefore, throughout this paper, it was important to analyze the identity of 
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each state. In addition, it was also important to analyze Islam and the origins of political 
Islam as the two states identify themselves as ‘Islamic States’  
Constructivists believe that the perception of allies and rivals, in-groups and out groups, 
are key determinant of a State’s behavior.270 Hence, this would explain the shift in 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran from alliance to rivalry. As previously 
mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia were close allies during the reign of the Shah. 
However, with rising of Ayatollah Khomeini to power, the identical clash between the 
two states had  changed the alliance into a rivalry. This rivalry took a religious discourse 
and therefore revived the Sunni-Shiite conflict in states such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain 
and Syria. 
The pan-Islamist competition for leadership between the two states, the promotion of 
their own religious sects and voicing disapproval and antipathy for the other sect had 
spread the struggle in the Arab World and fuelled past rivalries between the Sunnis and 
Shi’as in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Therefore, the main drive for the struggle 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the religious identity that both states maintain and such 
ideologies had a role in dividing the Middle East even further. 
Constructivists also stress on the ‘logic of appropriateness’; where rationality is heavily 
mediated by social norms.271 This could explain the changing nature of the Iranian-Saudi 
relationship through analyzing their domestic politics. The Saudi state is currently ruled 
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by the King and the Wahhabi ulama. Both are deeply opposed and threatened by 
‘Islamic Shi’ite State of Iran’ and therefore their policy of containment has remained 
unchanged since the Islamic revolution. While ideological changes in Iranian had led to 
a change in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The hardliners or 
conservatives in Iran ignite the Saudi-Iranian rivalry while the pragmatists and 
reformists ease the conflict.   
Lastly, constructivists recognize the importance of the role of non-state actor in 
international relations.272 Constructivists believe that transnational actors can shift the 
states belief or influence a state’s behavior and vice versa. This can be illustrated when 
looking at the changes of the Wahhabi ideology that was adopted by Saudi Arabia. The 
Muslim Brotherhood had an impact in radicalizing the Wahhabi ideology and therefore a 
direct influence in creating jihadist movements that started in Afghanistan. In addition, 
the Wahhabi religious institutions and pan-Islamist organizations that were funded by 
Saudi Arabia certainly had an impact on changing the behavior of states. Furthermore, 
such movements had an enormous effect in the creation of radical Islamist terrorist 
movements such as ISIL. It also provided such movements with the ideology, funds, 
volunteer and equipment. 
The creation of jihadist movements’ by Saudi Arabia was initially to serve as a political 
and ideological tool to eliminate Saudi’s rivals such as Iran. However, such movements   
had ideologically developed and turned against the Saudi monarchy. Therefore, even if 
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the Saudi state did not intent or support to create ISIL; it had built its ideological 
background indirectly. In addition, the state failed to control the amount of Saudi 
citizens that take part in funding and participating in the war; thus forcefully involving 
the state into the conflict.  
Shi’ite transnational organization had proved to be successful in expanding Iran’s role in 
the Middle East and the Islamic World. Organization such as Hizbulloh managed to gain 
mass support from both Sunni and Shi’ite followers while other movements managed to 
dominate or challenge Sunni rule in different states. 
In conclusion, this paper shows the importance of religion and identity in the Middle 
Eastern region; as most of the struggles that were witnessed in domestic or regional 
politics were ideological. Therefore, it’s natural that the greatest struggle within Islam 
had become the biggest struggle in the region led by Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite 
Iran. 
However, it would be interesting if the two states experience their own ‘Arab Spring’ or 
a regime change would occur in one of those states; how would this affect the 
relationship between the two states? Will the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict cease to exist?  Will 
this lead to the end of conflicts in the Middle East? Such answers could only be left for 
the future generation to answer. 
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from Sahīh Al-Bukhārī. 15th Rev. ed. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 1996 
140 
 
Iran. Who Holds the Power?" BBC News. Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.s
tm. 
"Iran's Conservatives and Reformers." Strategic Comments 4, no. 7 (1998): 1-2. Accessed 
November 27, 2014. 
http://www.tandfonline.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1080/1356788980473. 
"Iraq's History: An Interactive Timeline." Embassy of the Republic of Iraq Public 
Relations Office. Accessed November 30, 2014. http://www.iraqiembassy.us/page/iraqs-
history-an-interactive-timeline.  
 "Iraq Profile." BBC News. September 16, 2014. Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14546763.  
"ISIL Says It Faces War with Nusra in Syria." Al Jazeera English. March 8, 2014. 
Accessed November 30, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/isil-
says-it-faces-war-with-nusra-syria-20143719484991740.html. 
Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 
2009. 
J 
Jamail, Dahr. "Maliki's Iraq: Rape, Executions and Torture." Al Jazeera English. March 
19, 2013. Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2013/03/201331883513244683.html. 
Jankowski, James P. Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic. 
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001 
Johnson, Toni, and Mohammed Sergie. "Islam: Governing Under Sharia." Council on 
Foreign Relations. July 20, 2014. Accessed November 29, 2014. 
http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034. 
Jones, Owen. To Really Combat Terror, End Support for Saudi Arabia. August 31, 2014. 
Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/31/combat-terror-end-support-
saudi-arabia-dictatorships-fundamentalism. 
Jones, Toby. "Saudi Arabia's Not so New Anti-Shiism." Middle East Report, no. 242 
(2007): 29-32. Accessed November 27, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/stable/25164776?seq=4. 
"Jordan's King Calls for National Unity." Al Jazeera English. March 27, 2013. Accessed 
November 30, 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011327203224334931.html. 
K 
141 
 
Kazemi, Reza. Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ʻAlī. 
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